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I. INTRODUCTION 
The economics of education is currently a rather 
popular topic. Most of the work that has been done in this • 
area must be regarded as contributing to the macroeconomic 
aspects of education since it has concentrated largely on 
the relationship of education to the formation of human 
capital, on the returns to educational investments, or on 
the closely related matter of national educational decision 
making. This thesis is more concerned with the micro-
economic aspects of education. It deals with decision 
making within individual educational institutions. The 
specific educational units to be considered are departments 
and colleges. 
The impact of this particular study will necessarily 
be quite small, but it may be appropriate to consider the 
sorts of benefits which might result from increased 
attention to the microeconomics of education. 
Increased emphasis on the microeconomic aspects of 
education could prove useful for national educational 
planning. Very few of the educational institutions in the 
United States are operated by the Federal government. As 
a result, federal agencies must often resort to rather 
indirect means when trying to achieve federal objectives. 
If reliable microeconomic models of educational institutions 
\ 
were available, they might be used to help estimate the 
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effects of various possible federal instruments on the 
output and performance of educational institutions. 
In contrast to the Federal government, most state 
governments are directly and explicitly concerned with 
the operation of universities and colleges. Increased 
efficiency of decision making in state universities and 
colleges may, over time, result in demonstrable improve­
ment in their performance and presumably in better and 
more wisely directed support for higher education. 
Some benefits could accrue to individual educational 
institutions. Economic models can hardly be expected to 
replace human decision makers. However, they may provide 
organized ways of looking at some of the decision problems, 
or at some aspects of some problems faced by educational 
institutions. Even if the sorts of problems which can 
best be handled by models turn out to be only the most 
routine ones, use of economic models may yield benefits 
by allowing more of the effort of educational decision 
makers to be directed toward the more difficult problems. 
This study will present models which are intended to 
be of benefit primarily to individual educational institu­
tions. 
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II. GENERAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
The allocation problems of educational institutions 
are in some respects similar to the allocation problems 
faced by firms, households, and governments. In all cases 
the persons or institutions involved are faced with the 
problem of allocating scarce resources among alternative 
and competing ends or uses. Nevertheless, the task of 
formulating the allocation problems of educational 
institutions in such a way that they become amenable to 
economic analysis seems more difficult than that of 
formulating the allocation problems of firms, households, 
and governments. The fact that few persons have attempted 
it may at least suggest that this is the case. 
There are, broadly speaking, two sorts of problems 
which may be encountered. On the one hand, there is the 
view that educational institutions should not be 
subjected to the same sort of analysis as the firm and 
the household. On the other hand, there is the (not 
unrelated) problem of finding suitable data and other 
information about educational institutions. 
It is not clear just what aspect of education is 
supposed to render economic analysis inappropriate, 
Allan M, Cartter (11, p, 481) writes; 
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"Some of our academic colleagues would deny the 
relevance of economic rationality to such a 
serious matter as education - economics is for 
the world of wheat, automation, and stock 
markets, they would argue, while higher education 
is the world of humane learning, scholarly Inquiry 
and freedom of the spirit." 
It is true that the outputs of educational processes and 
the processes themselves are less tangible than those 
found in manufacturing. But it is unlikely that this alone 
has been the source of all reluctance to study the 
economics of educational institutions. The fact that 
educational Institutions are different should stimulate 
their study rather than discourage it. 
It is possible that economists (and others) are 
reluctant to study educational institutions because they 
feel that the study of educational institutions would 
adversely affect the institutions themselves. Since many 
of the persons otherwise qualified to study educational 
institutions are employed by such institutions, the 
imputation of special pleading may be made if the findings 
are in some sense favorable to them. On the other hand, 
they may fear that only a part of the total value of the 
outputs of their institutions can be measured, and the less 
important part at that. If so, administrators might plan, 
and legislators appropriate, only for the vocational 
components of institutional programs. 
However, it seems at least equally likely that 
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increased knowledge of the quantifiable aspects of their 
institutions would increase faculty interest in, and 
influence upon, educational policies and procedures. Such 
facts as are compiled about college and university 
operations at present seem to be used primarily by 
registrars, business officers, deans, and higher 
administrators. As a rule they are not designed or 
disseminated in such a way as to facilitate faculty 
participation in resource allocation and educational policy 
except on an ad hoc or piecemeal basis. 
Some members of the academic community may also fear 
that quantitative studies of their institutions would be 
used against them by legislators and taxpayers. 
Oversimplification or distortion of the findings might 
result in loss of revenue for the institutions, or in 
greater participation by elected officials in decisions 
previously left to the officers and faculty of the institu­
tions, It may be well to note that neither of these 
eventualities can be presumed undesirable from the standpoint 
of individual voters unless they are unaware of the 
consequences of the actions. However, employees of 
educational institutions can hardly be expected to favor 
either of these outcomes. They are inclined to feel that 
too few resources are allocated to education already, and 
that educational institutions are already subject to too 
much control by elected officials. 
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Besides having to overcome the view that educational 
institutions should not be the basis for scientific 
investigations, anyone attempting to conduct such an 
investigation is also faced with a lack of data. Not only 
is there a paucity of collected data, but, in addition, 
that which has been collected was collected mostly for 
accounting and control purposes and thus is not always very 
useful for other purposes. 
It might seem, therefore, that initial studies of 
educational institutions should be confined to data collection. 
This is not the only direction which can be taken, however, 
and is perhaps not even the best course to pursue. Some idea 
of the use to which the collected data might be put is 
likely to aid data collection. This suggests that some 
emphasis on model building prior to data collection might be 
appropriate. 
There is another reason for proceeding with model 
construction before much effort is expended on data collection. 
It may not be sufficient to discover and record the values 
which various variables have had at various times and at 
various institutions. This sort of information is of course 
useful since it may provide some indication of the feasible 
values of these variables and permit checks on information 
received from other sources. It may not, however, be able to 
provide sufficient information about the range of feasible 
values. When this seems to be the case, other sources must 
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be sought. Fortunately, such sources are available in the 
form of educators themselves. A good deal of the information 
needed is likely to be known in one form or another by 
faculty members and administrators of educational institu­
tions, Some of this information is knowi to them simply 
because of their familiarity with their particular institu­
tions. Other information is known to them because they are 
involved in determining the characteristics of the 
educational processes of their institutions and in formulating 
the goals and objectives of their institutions. 
The process of obtaining Information from educators 
is not without problems. The major problem is that educators 
seem to view educational institutions as consisting of one 
complex process whereas a model may need to view these 
institutions as being the framework in which many moderately 
interconnected processes are used. 
The information gathering problem is analogous to that 
which would be faced by a person trying to gain information 
about the production function, preference function, 
quantities of commodities consumed, and prices of outputs and 
and inputs on the mythical island inhabited by 
Robinson Crusoe. Assuming that no shifts have occurred in 
either the production function or utility function, Crusoe 
could probably give accurate information, based either on 
his records or on his plans for the next period, about the 
equilibrium levels of all outputs and inputs. He probably 
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could not as easily give accurate information about the 
equilibrium price ratios implied by the chosen levels of 
inputs and outputs, nor about his complete preference 
function or production function simply because he has 
little need to think about these things. He need not be 
concerned with price ratios since his island is a closed 
economy without exchange. However, if an attempt were made 
to construct an economic model of the island, somewhat more 
complete information about the production and preference 
functions would be needed. 
The most expert source of information about these 
functions is Crusoe himself-, but since he is not accustomed 
to thinking in terms of production and preference functions, 
the model builder would have to sort through any information 
received from Crusoe in order to determine whether it is 
(a) related to the production function, (b) related to the 
preference function, or (c) irrelevant. Educators are 
perhaps even less used to thinking about their activities 
in terms of production functions, products, prices, and 
related concepts. Thus it is likely that much of the 
information which could be received from them may be hard to 
identify as being related to one of the concepts which would 
be relevant to any model. 
Because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable and 
relevant Information either from previously collected data 
or records or from the "engineers" of the educational 
9 
institutions (i.e. the faculty and administrators), it 
seems appropriate to first form some general idea of the 
set of concepts about which information is desired. While 
the specific information required will depend upon (a) the 
particular institution or type of institution studied, (b) 
the particular problem, process, or division of the 
institution which is studied, and (c) the mathematical or 
economic model used a basis for analysis and model construc­
tion, certain general types of information would seem to 
be useful in most cases. It would seem that information 
is needed about (a) the outputs of the institution, (b) 
the inputs used by the institution, and (c) the relationships 
which exist between the inputs and the outputs. The 
information needs in these areas are not entirely indepen­
dent but separate treatment may allow a more understandable 
exposition of the needs in each area. 
Consider first the outputs of the institution. Outputs 
of production processes are usually thought of as being 
tangible commodities whose qualitative and quantitative 
aspects are standardized and fairly well known. A somewhat 
wider view Is relevant for the outputs of educational 
institutions. Some ways of looking at the outputs of 
educational institutions would direct attention to the 
relatively Intangible aspects of their outputs. It is 
sometimes said that the outputs^ of educational institutions 
Include the production, preservation, and transmission of 
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knowledge. Not only are these outputs rather intangible, 
but, in addition, neither their qualitative nor their 
quantitative aspects are easily measured. 
In order to construct an economic model of an 
educational Institution, it is necessary to know what the 
outputs are and which are important for purposes of the 
model being constructed. Beyond that it is also necessary 
to know how to measure, or to decide upon some procedure 
for measuring, the outputs. 
Closely related to the problem of specifying the 
outputs, is the problem of deciding what attitude should be 
taken toward them. Should some function of them be 
maximized? Should their output levels equal or exceed certain 
target values? Should some other attitude be taken with 
respect to the outputs? For the purposes of further 
exposition it will be assumed that the first attitude will 
be taken even though most previous models of non-market 
institutions have chosen the second attitude?" If the 
attitude is taken that some function of the outputs should be 
maximized, it is necessary to arrive at the function and at 
the parameters of that function. 
In more direct terms, it can be said that arriving at 
a function to maximize is roughly equivalent to deciding what 
^The more common procedure is to minimize some function 
of the input while ensuring that the outputs satisfy certain 
targets. The more general approach would be to maximize some 
function of both outputs and inputs. 
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values or weights to associate with a unit of each type of 
output. Part of this problem is to decide on the source 
of the value of the outputs. If the approach is to be a 
normative one, the source of value for the purpose of the 
constructed model may be the market or a preconceived 
objective or social welfare function. If, on the other 
hand, the approach is to be a more positive one, the most 
immediate source of value is the objective function, or 
preference function, of the relevant decision maker. His 
objective function may in turn be influenced by the market 
or by some other source or system of value. Knowing the 
source of value of the outputs is not by itself sufficient 
to insure knowledge either of the function to be maximized 
or its parameters, although it can be a useful aid since it 
provides an indication of where to look for information about 
such a function. 
There is also a need to specify the inputs, decide how 
to measure them, and arrive at their value. These problems 
are not, however, as acute as the analogous problems on the 
output side. This is largely due to the fact that present 
budgeting and accounting procedures have resulted in the 
categorization, measurement, and rewarding of some of the 
inputs. While the present treatment of the inputs may not 
always be exactly what is needed for any particular model, 
it provides, nevertheless, a good deal of information about 
12 
the inputs of educational institutions. 
Some inputs are not treated very explicitly in present 
budgeting procedures but may nevertheless be scarce enough 
to limit the output of the institution. Others may not 
currently be limiting the output of the institution but 
may become limiting if the output mix is changed or if the 
available amounts of other inputs are changed?" Ways must be 
found to measure and, whenever necessary, determine the 
value of these inputs 2 
Information is also needed about the relationships 
which exist between the inputs and outputs. Which outputs 
are desired, how should they be measured, and what values do 
they have are questions which may be answered in part by 
persons or forces outside of educational institutions. 
Likewise, exogenous forces may specify the inputs to be 
used, the available quantities of these inputs, and the 
values of the inputs. Partly for historical reasons, but 
presumably primarily because of their greater competence in 
such matters, educators themselves have been responsible for 
Isee (42) for a better treatment of this idea. 
^The section which dealt with the outputs took, at least 
implicitly, the view that only the quantities of outputs were 
arguments of the preference function. It is likely that the 
objective or preference function may also include as 
arguments the quantities of some of the inputs. 
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the design of the educational processes which link the 
inputs and outputs of educational institutions. 
It is not to be expected that the average educator 
can provide both the functional form and the parameters 
of the production functions. About the most that one can 
expect to obtain from educators, or from educational 
institution data, is some idea about some of the input-
output combinations which are feasible. 
Some of the relationships between inputs and outputs 
may not be technological relationships. Decision makers 
outside the particular part of the educational institution 
being considered may impose restrictions on the input-
output combinations which may be used. They may, for 
example, place restrictions on the output mix or on the 
input mix. They may prohibit the use of otherwise feasible 
processes. Alternatively, the terms under which certain of 
the inputs are obtained may limit the uses to which these 
resources may be put.^ 
Isee (26) for some idea about how these restrictions 
might apply to research funds. 
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature contains only a limited number of 
reports of attempts to construct economic or decision 
models of educational institutions or systems. On the other 
hand, there is a large and ever increasing volume of 
literature dealing with other aspects of the "economics of 
education". It appears that (with a few exceptions) most 
of the publications on this broader topic contribute little 
information and few concepts useful in the present study. 
Nevertheless, here and there, there are to be found a few 
grains of information and a few concepts which may prove 
useful. 
This section consists of two parts. The first part is 
devoted to those contributions which have provided informa­
tion or concepts useful to the present study. The second 
part Will review those publications which seem to have the 
most to contribute to this study. No attempt will be made 
to provide a complete review of, nor to criticize 
thoroughly, the studies mentioned. Instead the emphasis 
will be placed on those portions of the studies which have 
provided, or which have attempted to provide, information 
or concepts which might be useful for economic models of 
educati onal insti tuti ons. 
Pew (if any) comprehensive lists of the outputs of 
educational institutions have ever been published. The 
15 
literature does contain several different views about what 
the outputs are. Kidd (27, PP. 25-26) suggests that the 
functions of American universities are preservation of 
knowledge, transmission of knowledge, production of 
knowledge, and service to the community. Schultz 
(35, pp. 39-^2) lists the functions of the educational 
establishment as research, discovery and cultivation of 
potential talent, increasing the capability of people to 
adjust to changes in job opportunities associated with 
economic growth, recruiting and instructing students for the 
teaching profession, and furnishing high level manpower for 
a country. Williams (42, p. 186) suggests that the outputs 
of educational Institutions include (a) first degree 
graduates with pass degrees or honors degrees of class one, 
two, or three, (b) higher degree graduates in different 
subjects with masters degrees, doctorates, or diplomas for 
advanced studies, (c) research and writings of staff members. 
The main difference between these lists of outputs or 
functions is the degree of finality of the outputs on the 
lists. Transmission of knowledge surely involves both 
written instruction (publications) and oral instruction 
(classroom teaching) by faculty members. Presumably at 
least the oral instruction is Instrumental in producing some 
of the effects listed by Schultz. Students may be regarded 
as carriers, vectors, or agents through which teaching is 
able to produce high level manpower, new teachers. 
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flexibility for economio growth, and other capabilities. 
Currently, the most common doses of, or exposures to, 
teaching received by students are the amounts required by 
various degree programs. Degrees may thus be regarded as 
outputs intermediate between teaching and the outputs 
listed by Schultz. 
If the various sorts of outputs could be produced 
only in some fixed ratios to each other, it would not 
matter which view of the outputs is adopted. This is not 
the case, however, and the result is that even when one 
view is adopted, the others cannot be completely ignored. 
One cannot consider degrees awarded to be a homogeneous 
sort of output since it is possible that even within the 
requirements set by any particular degree program the 
amount of high level manpower per degree, the amount of 
flexibility per degree, and the amounts of other desiderata 
per degree may not be fixed but may vary somewhat. To the 
extent that the ratios of these latter outputs can be 
influenced, it may be appropriate to classify degree outputs 
not only by level and subject but also by the amounts of 
these other outputs per degree. 
Most of the conceptual problems encountered in the 
measurement of outputs are problems of deciding what to 
measure, or of deciding what weights to give to each of 
several measurements. For example, for some purposes it 
would be convenient to have an aggregate measure of the 
17 
human capital which can be attributed to education. 
Bovnnan (9) suggests the following alternative measures: 
(a) number of school years completed, (b) number of 
efficiency equivalence units, (c) base year lifetime 
incomes, (d) base year production costs, and (e) current 
real production costs. Alternative (a) suggests measuring 
human capital by measuring one of the inputs (years of 
schooling) involved in its production. Alternatives (d) 
and (e) suggest that production costs be used as a measure. 
Alternatives (b) and (c) suggest using productivity or 
market value as a measure of human capital. 
Likewise the conceptual problems involved in determining 
the value of educational outputs are problems of deciding 
what aspects of the outputs are valuable, and of deciding 
upon the source of this value. Several writers have argued 
that a significant portion of the benefits of education accrue 
not to the educated person, but to his neighborhood, to his 
community, or to society as a whole. Blaug (6) and Denison 
(l6) have suggested that education contributes to economic 
growth. Polsom (18) has argued that "everyone should help 
pay for education since everyone benefits". Eckaus (17) 
claims that wage and salary differentials between educated 
and uneducated persons are not accurate indicators of the 
differences in marginal productivity between educated and 
uneducated persons. 
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Other persons, including Professor Friedman (20) have 
claimed that, at least at the college level, most of the 
benefits of education accrue to the person who receives 
the education.^ They argue that the major limitation of 
the market's evaluation of education is due to the fact 
that loans for investments in education and in other forms 
of human capital cannot be obtained as easily, nor at the 
same interest rate, as loans for investments in physical 
capital. These persons do not deny the existence of third 
party effects due to education but instead claim that they 
are small and that they may, in some cases, not even be 
positive.2 
Several persons have attempted to estimate the value 
of education.3 Most of the investigators have been concerned 
with the estimation of increases in lifetime incomes due to 
obtaining an undergraduate degree. Some of the investigators 
have chosen rate of return calculations to summarize their 
results; other have chosen present value calculations. 
Those using rate of return calculations have reported 
^See also (40) and (44). 
2see (2, p. 103) for some of the negative effects which 
could accrue from education. 
^See, for example, (3), (23), (24), (32), (41), and 
( 4 5 ) .  
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rates of return ranging from about 5:% to 14.5^* Ti/fo factors, 
other than differences in the samples used, have undoubtedly 
contributed to the differences in results. Generally, the 
higher rates of return have resulted from studies which 
have largely ignored the effects of income-affecting 
variables other than education. The figure is due to 
Hunt (24). His analysis is different from most others. For 
undergraduate education he attempted to estimate the rate of 
return associated with increased expenditure per pupil. 
Hunt calculated rates of return on graduate studies 
using the more conventional approach. For Master's degrees 
he obtained rates of return of about zero to minus one 
percent; for Ph.D. degrees the calculated rates of return 
were about one to two percent. 
Those using the present value approach reported 
present values (at age fourteen) for undergraduate 
education (for males) ranging from §1,700 to $100,000. The 
larger figure is attributed to Click and Miller (21, p. 310). 
It was obtained from U.S. census data by using a zero 
^See (24 and (3), respectively. 
^The rate of return as most commonly computed for a 
particular level of education tends to estimate the rate of 
return that would be forthcoming from additional investment 
in education if that investment allowed more persons to 
attain that level of education. 
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interest rate. Houthakker (23, p. 28) verified this estimate, 
and also demonstrated that applying an 8^ interest rate to 
income after income tax would reduce tae estimate to $3,000. 
Wilkinson (4l, p. 562) used data for Canada and obtained 
estimates of ^il2,000 and $1,700 when using interest rates of 
5'^ and 10$, respectively, for discounting income after 
income tax. 
Several writers have critized the rate of return 
approach.^ Some of the criticism has been directed at the 
data used for rate of return calculations. Others have 
insisted that the rate of return approach is less relevant 
than the present value approach. Part of this criticism is 
based on the fact that for net return sérias which have 
2 
several sign reversals the rate of return need not be 
unique. This criticism is not particularly important for 
the present work. It is generally felt that an individual's 
net return stream due to an additional increment of education 
has only one sign reversal. Furthermore, if multiple sign 
reversals occurred, the statistical techniques used could not 
be expected to verify their existence with any reasonable 
Isee especially (22), (31)» and (46). 
net return series R-t has at least one sign reversal 
unless Rt>0 for all relevant t or Rt^O for all relevant t. 
It has more than one sign reversal, if for. some ti<t2<t3,._ 
Rti, Rt3^0 and Rt2^0 or if for some 
and Rt^>0. 
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degree of certainty. 
Neither of these approaches will be used directly In 
this study. For studies of this type, however, the 
present value approach seems more useful. The advantage 
of this approach is that it is more readily adapted to 
models in which some of the elements of the net returns 
stream are endogenously determined. If some discount 
rate r* is selected as being most appropriate, then the 
present value of an Investment is a linear function of the 
form m 
The problems of deciding what the inputs are, and what 
their values are, have not received as much attention in 
the literature as the analogous problems on the output side. 
Some contributions have been made on the input side, 
however. Cartter (10) has recently completed a study of 
the quality of graduate faculties and graduate programs. 
His study not only indicated that differences in the quality 
of various graduate faculties had been perceived but also 
that the differences in ratings were largely independent of 
the age, rank, or geographical location of the raters. 
Becker (3) and others have included the value of student 
time in their estimates of the costs of a college education. 
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In their studies, the value of student time accounts for 
a large part of the total costs of a college level education. 
Becker (4) has recently shown that, under certain 
assumptions, the value of the time used is an important 
component of the cost of consuming goods as well. Although 
his result seems to overstate the actual situation, there 
seems to be no doubt that the opportunity cost of the 
students' time should be important in his decision about 
college attendance. 
Contribution by Stone and Blaug suggest that the 
problem of discovering the value of the student input is 
not as simple as Becker suggests. Blaug (6) warns that 
private motivations are important to any policy which seeks 
to change the educational level. Stone (38) suggests that 
the concept of the "demand for places"^ is useful when 
considering the student inputs. Stone (38, p. 186) also 
writes : 
2 the economics of demand (for education) 
are rather shadowy since . . . families of most 
^The "demand for place" is the demand by students for 
admission to educational institutions. 
^The words (for education) were not included by" Stone 
but were added here to make the meaning somewhat clearer. 
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students will bear directly only a small part of 
the costs of education. On the whole this seerns 
to me a rather desirable state of affairs but it 
throws back on those responsible for general social 
and economic policy the decision of how much of the 
national resources should be devoted to education. 
This brings us to an area of social cost-benefit 
analysis in which market values are a necessary 
but by no means sufficient ingredient." 
The number of articles and other publications dealing 
with production functions or other relationships between 
inputs and outputs in colleges and universities is rather 
small. Apparently most of that sort of research has 
concentrated at the elementary and secondary school level. 
The parameter most frequently mentioned in publications 
dealing with higher education seems to be the student/staff 
ratio and its variants. Bolt et (?) and Stoikov (37) 
have included a production function for scientists in the 
models which they have designed to aid in the allocation 
of scientific effort. The production function used was 
essentially: P = r E where 
P = the rate of production of new Ph.D. 's 
E = the number of educational scientists (full time 
equivalent) 
r = the number of new Ph.B*s per man year of teaching 
Maul (3^0 and Cartter (12) have used essentially the same 
^The Bolt et al. version is presented here. 
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sort of function in their analyses of the future quality 
of college faculties (measured by % of faculty with Ph.D.'s). 
Cartter's version of the production function is; 
?t = Pt-1 + - Et_i) where 
= the number of faculty members in year t 
= the enrollment in year t 
f = the staff/student ratio 
A few persons have constructed more or less complete 
models of educational institutions or educational systems. 
Some of these will be reviewed briefly here, 
Mrs. Adelman (1) has constructed educational planning 
models for Argentina, She treated the educational system 
as one sector in a linear programming formulation of the 
whole economy. The major difference between each of her 
models is the particular objective function chosen to be 
maximized,^ 
Bowles (8) has constructed an educational planning 
model for Northern Nigeria, The value of the objective 
function of the model equals the net contribution of the 
educational sector to the present value of present and 
future national income. The activities in the model are 
^Several different objective functions were used. One 
of them was designed to maximize the rate of growth; 
another was designed to maximize the employment rate. 
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limited to the processes of the educational sector. The 
constraints Include restrictions on the supply of internally 
produced inputs such as teachers and students as well as 
restrictions on the supply of exogeneously produced inputs 
such as funds to support the schools and on the supply of 
beginning (6 year old) students. The source of value of 
the outputs is the productive sector of the economy. 
Intrilligator and Smith (25) have constructed a model 
which is designed to help guide the allocation of scientific 
effort between teaching and research. Their model empha­
sizes the social benefits as the source of value of educational 
outputs. They assume that the output from teaching and 
research can be measured by the number of (full time 
equivalent) teaching and research scientists, respectively. 
Their model is; 
b = b(t) is the path over time of the percentage of 
new scientists allocated to teaching 
f = gS(t) is the educational production function 
d = the rate of exit from the profession 
VJ = welfare 
o^bo^bab^fl o^bo^bdbi^l 
subject to 
where S(t) = ^ R(t) = 
at 
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t = time 
t — o initial (present) time 
t = T terminal (future) time 
R(T) = research scientists at time t 
S(t) = teaching scientists at time t 
P = is a future component of welfare 
I = is the rate of increment to welfare 
from time t = 0 to t = T 
Using the techniques of control theory, optimal time paths 
for b were derived under several different specifications of 
W. __ 
Stone (38) has constructed a dynamic input-output 
model of the British educational system. The numbers of 
persons leaving the educational system after receiving 
various amounts of education can be considered the final 
products of the system,^ but the demand for places seems to 
be a more direct determinant of amounts of the various 
non-student education inputs which are required. For the 
purposes of the model the demand for places is treated 
partly as a set of epidemic processes and is assumed partly 
determined by economic prospects. The demand for places at 
any given level is treated as an epidemic process of the 
n: -1 
^Actually h g fits better the formal requirements of 
a final product vector since the flow equation of the model 
is S = h JSS + h g where S = stock of students at tha^ , 
beginning of a year, h = a matrix of survival rates,j 
g = graduate leavers at the end of the year, and SS^ = à . 
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form: 
^ ~ ^ 1 - P^) where 
Pj_ = the proportion of students who attended the 
1th process during the last year 
(1 - b. - P. ) = the proportion who did not attend 
but who have the ability and who 
in happier circumstances would 
wish to attend 
The demand for places within any level of education is 
yielded by the relation: 
E rj = rj + (1 - r* where 
2 rj,t = fj.t+l 
r, = the proportion of students who demand places 
^ in the jth specialty 
rt = the equilibrium proportion given present 
prospects, that is the proportion which 
would exist on an objective assessment of 
prospects, 
= a parameter reflecting the rate at which 
^ actual proportions adjust to equilibrium 
proportions. 
The demands e,^ and supplies eg of different types of teachers 
can be derived from the relations: 
Ee^^ = AEs and 
Eeg = (I - C)eg + Bg where 
A is a matrix of staff-to-student ratios 
C is a matrix of wastage rates 
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B is a matrix reflecting the proportions of the 
graduates at various levels who enter the 
various types of teaching 
g is a vector of graduates 
E is an operator which advances the time 
subscript of any variable which preceeds by 
one year 
Winkelmann (43) has constructed a model designed to 
aid in the allocation of the time of faculty members among 
various available teaching and research assignments. Whereas 
the models discussed above are concerned with the allocation 
of educational resources on a large (usually national) 
scale, his model deals with allocations decisions faced by 
an individual department chairman. Specifically, the model 
is designed to allocate fixed faculty resources among 
research and teaching assignments. It is assumed that the 
department under consideration has not only a fixed set of 
faculty resources, but has, as well, a fixed set of teaching 
requirements to fulfill. It is also convenient to assume 
that the set of research opportunities is fixed. 
The inputs considered in the model are the individual 
faculty members. The unit of measurement of the inputs is 
the amount of time required to teach one section of any 
course, or to complete any single research assignment. The 
outputs are teaching and research. They are measured in two 
ways. One method measures outputs by the amount of faculty 
resources required to perform them. Under this method of 
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measurement there is little scope for optimization. Both 
the quantities of inputs available and the quantities of 
inputs required are fixed, thus all that can be done is 
to determine whether or not a feasible solution exists. 
The second method uses value as the measure of the 
outputs. Under this method total output is measured in 
terms of its contribution to the present value of future 
national income. The model thus uses this second measure 
of output as its objective function while the first method 
of measurement is instrumental in defining the constraints 
of the model. 
In order to implement this model it is necessary to be 
able to estimate the value of each feasible allocation. Its 
author presents a procedure by which a linear objective 
function based partly on market information and partly on 
the department chairman's subjective evaluations could be 
derived. 
Plessner and Pox (33) have constructed a linear 
programming model of a department. Their model deals with 
output level decisions. The outputs included in their 
model were degrees awarded and hours of research completed. 
The degrees awarded were classified by degree level and, in 
the case of Ph,D, degrees, by means of support. Thus the 
degree outputs included B.S. degrees, M.S. degrees, Ph.D. 
degrees awarded to persons not on appointment (i.e. 
candidates supported by fellowships, other employment, or 
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personal resources), Ph.D. degrees awarded to persons who 
had been instructors, and Ph.D. degrees awarded to persons 
who had held appointments as research assistants. 
The model's inputs included office space, students, 
and faculty time. It was assumed that the department was 
endowed with certain quantities of these inputs. It was 
further assumed that additional amounts of all resources 
except students could be "purchased" at prevailing market 
prices. 
The number of hours of research completed was required 
to equal or exceed times the number of hours of faculty 
time with which the department was originally endowed plus 
times the number of "purchased" faculty hours.^ The 
other outputs and all inputs except students were regarded 
as flexible targets. The levels of these outputs and 
inputs were to be selected so as to maximize (subject to 
the constraints in the model) the department's net contribu­
tion to the present value of national product. 
One version of the model dealt with a four year 
planning period. Output decisions made prior to the first 
year of the planning period provided constraints in addition 
to those provided by resource limitations. 
^The coefficients and <^2 were set equal to 
minimum proportions of their time that "original" and "new" 
faculty members, respectively, would insist on devoting to 
research. 
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IV. MATHEMATICAL TOOLS TO BE USED 
One possible use of a model of an educational 
institution would be to aid in the selection of values of 
certain variables (such as output levels, and the amounts 
of faculty time and other resources to be allocated to 
various functions) from among those values which are 
feasible, so as to maximize the value of some preference 
function. Formally, this involves finding a vector 
X* such that f(3d^) = max f(x) where f(x) is the institutions' 
xex 
preference function and X is the set of feasible values of 
X . 
Economists are rather familiar with this sort of 
problem. Much of economic theory Is based on this sort of 
mathematical model. In the case of consumption theory f (x ) 
is a function representing the consumer's preference 
ordering and x is the set of commodity bundles which the 
consumer can afford. In the theory of the firm f(x) is 
often the profit function and X is the set of feasible 
input-output combinat!ons. 
Often economists are not so much concerned with 
finding the maximizer x* as with examining the characteristics 
of the solution and the symptoms of optimizing behavior. 
Thus economists have long used calculus and the theory of 
constrained maximization to derive the "marginal conditions" 
and to determine the form and characteristics of demand or 
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supply functions. More recently some elements of set 
theory have partially replaced calculus as a tool for 
examining the characteristics of optimum solutions. 
Activity analysis and convex programming have also 
been used to examine the characteristics of optimum 
solutions. Some formulations of these two tools have also 
found extensive use in applied economic research. In this 
latter application linear programming and other formulations 
of activity analysis and/or convex programming have been 
used to calculate the maximizer x% 
Activity analysis as formulated by Koopmans has found 
some use in economic theory.^ Some of the features and 
results of his formulation are useful in the present study. 
Koopman's activity analysis model has the form; 
^This requirement that the objective function not 
exhibit saturation of demand for any of the final commodities 
is not too important to the present study and will often be 
relaxed. 
max f(yfin) 
where f can be any function such that 
f(yfin) > f(yfin) if y > 
^This section is based on Koopmans (28) 
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Koopmans uses two concepts, the commodity and the 
activity, to provide a bridge between the linear model 
y = A% and observable production processes, ^ach commodity 
is assumed to be homogeneous qualitatively and continuously 
divisible quantitatively. Commodities include primary 
factors, intermediate products, and final products. 
Primary factors are commodities which can be made to flow 
into the economy from nature or from the outside world. 
pri ^ vector of the rates at which the orimary factors 
flow into the economy, Yp^i Is the vector of the rates of 
use of primary factors. Final products are those desired 
commodities which are not primary factors, y^^^ is a vector 
of the rates of production of final products^ Those 
commodities which are neither primary factors nor final 
products are called intermediate products. Each intermediate 
product is an output of at least one activity and an input 
of at least one other activity. Yint ^ vector of net 
rates of production (rates of production minus rates of use) 
of intermediate products. 
In Koopmans* treatment of activity analysis an activity 
consists of the combination of certain commodities (inputs) 
in fixed ratios to produce certain other commodities 
(outputs) in fixed quantitative ratios to the inputs.^ 
Isee (28, p. 4?). 
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Thus an activity is an elementary production function 
which is homogeneous of degree one. By admitting a large 
number of activities any production function which exhibits 
non increasing returns and is homogeneous of degree one 
can be approximated as closely as desired in an activity 
analysis model. 
Koopmans uses several other definitions in his 
discussion of activity analysis. Some of these are presented 
below: 
Def, 1, "A point y in the commodity space is called 
possible in a technology A if there exists 
a point X in the activity space satisfying 
y = Ax , X = 0"^ 
Def. 2. "A point y in the commodity space is called 
attainable if there exists a point x in the 
activity space such that 
= Ax,x= 0, 7fxn~ 0 
and such that y<nt y^ri satisfy (5.1) and 
(5.2) respectively"2 
Def. 3. "A point y in the commodity space is called 
efficient if it is attainable and if there 
exists no attainable point y such that 
yfin - yfin~0."^ 
^See (28, p. 4?). 
^See (28, p. 79). (5.1) and (5.2) require that yi^t ~ 0 
ypri ' "= 0 • 
3see (28, p. 79). 
y  =  yfi5 Pint 
ypri 
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Some of the results of the study of activity analysis 
may also be useful. It has been shown^ that an attainable 
point y is efficient if and only if there exists a vector P 
such that 
P'A= 0, P'y = 0, Pfin > 0, Pp^^^ ^  0, P^^^ = 0 
where Pf^n» Pprizs» ^pri respectively those components 
of the vector P which correspond to find commodities, 
exhausted primary factors, and unexhausted primary factors. 
2 It has also been shovm that an attainable point y is 
efficient if and only if there exists a positive vector 
TTfij^ such that Tr'fin^fin reaches a maximum, within the 
attainable point set, in y. 
A version of activity analysis widely used in applied 
economic research is linear programming. Its wide use has 
undoubtedly both stimulated and resulted from the development 
of operational solution procedures and computer programs. 
Linear programming is a very versatile tool since it can be 
applied not only to linear problems but can also provide 
approximate solutions to some non-linear problems. By virtue 
of one of the results noted above it is apparent that 
linear programming can be used to find the efficient points 
Isee (28, p. 62). 
^See (28, p. 86). 
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in more general activity analysis problems.! 
The general form of a linear program is 
(4.2) maz c®x 
X ="1% I  Ax = b, X - oJ- . 
The dual of (4.2) is: 
(4.3) min v* b 
v«V 
V =jv I A®v - c, V - Oj* . 
Several theorems have been established which deal 
with linear programs. The ones which seem the most useful 
for this study are those which deal with the relationships 
that can exist between the solution of the primal (4,2 for 
example), and the dual (4,3 for example) of a linear program. 
Some of the possibilities are summarized in Table 1, 
Bantzig and Wolfe (15) have developed an algorithm 
for solving certain types of large linear programs» This 
algorithm is most useful for those linear programs which 
1 Charnes and Cooper (13) have developed a procedure 
for finding these efficient points. 
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Table 1, Relationships which can exist between the solution 
to primal (4.2) and dual (4.3) forms of linear 
programs.& 
4.2 has a feasible 4.2 has no 
solution feasible solution 
( X/6 0 ) ( X = gf ) 
4.3 has a feasible 
solution 
max C*x 
X  e x  
= minv'b 
v€; V" 
minv'b —^ - oo 
V Ê V 
( V ^ 0 ) 
4.3 has no feasible 
solution 
max C'X 
X € X 
possible 
( V  =  0 )  
^Adapted from (14, p. 128). 
involve an A matrix of the form 
A = 
Ai Ag 
Al 
&2 o 
o &1 
and for which the number of rows in the A^'s is amall relative 
to the total number of rows in A. Their algorithm takes 
advantage of the fact that, if X j, is bounded, then for any 
vector belonging to X^ there exist soalars^^^^, . . . 
such that 
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=z: 
j=i 
) ^j_j — 1» i — If 2 • • • n j=l 
J  0 ,  J —  l j 2 « « . i i i ^ j i = l , 2 « » » î i  
where the x^j's are the extreme points of the setXj_. 
For a linear program suitable for the application of their 
algorithm the sets X are given by 
2^ i i j^i^i" ^ i »^i~ ^  
where and bj_ are the relevant portions of the x and b 
vectors of 4.2. 
Dantzig and Wolfe have shotvn that if the sets X ^  
are bounded for i = 1, 2 . .n , then problem 4.2 is 
equivalent to 4.5» 
n 
(4.5) maxVij ^ij 
1=1 j=l 
subject to 
II ZI ° ^  
i=l j=l 
^ T. _ 
' ij ~ 1 * 1 ~ 1; 2 . .n 
i=l 
j = 0, j = 1, . . * m 
i = 1, . . .n 
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The B4 4*8 and ^  ^ ' ij's are obtained by letting 
Bij =Âi and 
Y 
^ij = ^ i Zij 
The major advantage of the algorithm is due to the^fact that 
for many problems it is not necessary to use all (m ) 
i—1 i 
columns of ^.5 to obtain a solution to 4.5. An iterative 
procedure has been developed which involves, initially, the 
construction of only as many columns as are needed to obtain 
a feasible solution to problem 4.5.^ Additional columns 
are then generated, as needed, during each phase of the 
procedure. 
The Nth phase of the procedure has two parts, the first 
of which involves solving the dual of the Nth phase version 
of problem 4.7. „ <^ij> 
(4.7) max C C 
subject to 
r 21 B,,ï,,6b 
i=l j=l ^ 
;^<N> j = l ,  i = l ,  2 ,  .  
j=l 
\j - 0 . ;î = 1, 2 . . m^^N^ 
i = 1, 2, . . n 
1Their algorithm can also be used to obtain a feasible 
solution. 
N^ equals the number of extreme points of the set 
X.1 which have been used to construct the Nth phase version 
of 4.7. 
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The second part of the Nth phase involves solving n 
subprograms. The Nth phase version of the ith subprogram 
is given by 4,8. 
-  (  7 < N > ) -  q  ^  
and are elements of the vector, VC^}, which 
solves the dual to the Nth phase version of 4.?. 
is the element of which corresponds to the restriction 
"^ij Is the element of which 
corresponds to the restriction 23%^^j = 1, 
Those subprogram (extreme point) solution vectors 
A 
x^^N^ which correspond to positive * s are used to 
generate columns which are added to the Nth phase version 
of 4,7 to form the (N+l)th phase version of 4,7. 
This iterative procedure continues until at the end 
A . 
of some phase, say the Mth, = 0 for i = 1, 2, , , , n. 
The solution to the Mth phase version of 4,7 can be used 
to obtain a solution to 4,2, The solution vector to 4,2 
is obtained by letting 
* ™i<M> * 
X, = 5Zr 2 1 for i = 1, 2 , , , , n. 
i IJ 
The procedure outlined above often must be modified 
when it is applied to problems for which not all of the 
sets are bounded. If the set is not bounded it is 
not possible to express every vector x^ belonging to as a 
(non negative weights) weighted average of the extreme 
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points of X-,^ . However, there always exist scalars s 
\h2 * * * * "^hni^ ' ^^ hl * * *-^^kn that 
^ h - 4%: "^hj -hj ^^hl -hi 
J —1 1—1 
EV;-
y~ "X, . = 1 ; h = 1, , • , on 
'/^hl =0,3=1,2. la n 1 = 1, 2 . . . 1%, h = 1 s 2 . . • n 
where thex^j's are the extreme points of the set 
and thex^^'s are the extreme points of the set a^(0) 
-f^h L^h ^ 'h Oj"' 
Thus when not all of the sets X^ are bounded 4.2 is 
2 
not equivalent to 4.5 but it is equivalent to 4.9. 
1=1 J=1 
subject to 
Éi ' + £i  ^
/ i ~ 1 ; 1 — 1> 2 . . . n 
3=1 ' 
J — Oj j — Ij 2 . . .1.1^ 
Ç i = 1, 2 . . n 
il~^' 1 — 2 . . »kj^ 
ll is a column vector of ones. 
^This may happen even when X is bounded. 
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The Nth phase of the modified procedure also has two 
parts. The first part involves solving the dual of the Kth 
phase version of problem 4.10. 
n ni 
(4.10) max 2— (Z— û i 4 ^4 4 + 5 ^ il-^il) i=l j=l 
n k VN> 
subject to T- Y— B "X + 5— B xV 
mi<N> 
22 j = 1, i = 1, 2 . . . n 
j=l 
"Xij = 0,j = 1, 2, 3 . . i = 1, 2 . . n 
^il -01 = 1,2.... 
The second part of the Nth phase of the modified 
procedure involves solving n subprograms. V/henever possible 
the subprograms will have the form of 4.8. For those 
cases (i.e. those values of N and i) f-or which unbounded 
solutions result to subprograms having the form of 4.8, 
subprograms having the form 4.11 are solved. 
(4.11) max - (^ <'N>) ' 
Xi^XiTo) 
Extreme point solutions resulting from solving 
lkXN> equals the number of extreme points of the 
set Xj_(0) which have been used to construct the Nth phase 
version of 4.10. 
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subprograms having the form of 4.8 are treated as described 
in the original procedure. Extreme point solutions which 
result from the solution of subprograms having the form of 
4,11 are used to form columns which will be added (along 
with those resulting from solution of subprograms having 
the form 4.8) to the Nth phase version of 4.10 to form the 
(N + l)th phase version of 4,10, The only difference 
between the two types of columns is that those resulting 
from extreme points of (0) do not have a one (1) in that 
row corresponding to the restriction ^ "Xij = 1 
j=l 
whereas those which result from extreme points of X . do 
— 1 
have a one in that row. 
The termination conditions and the translation of 
solutions of 4.10 into solutions of 4.2 are exactly the same 
as for the unmodified procedure. 
The last tool to be discussed in this section is the 
Tinbergen-type approach.^ While this approach is not itself 
a mathematical tool it has proven useful since it allows 
the formulation of certain problems in such a way that they 
can be solved by mathematical tools. Its primary area of 
application has been in economic policy but it is easily 
applied to many other problems. The Tinbergen approach 
^This section is based on Pox, Sengupta, and 
Thorbecke (19, pp. 448-450). 
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consists of three basic elements. 
The first element is the decision maker's welfare or 
preference function. The decision maker's welfare function 
is used since in many applications it is not reasonable to 
believe that the relevant social welfare function based on 
individual preferences can be found. 
The second element is the classification of the 
variables. The first class consists of the exogenous 
variables. Included in this class are the policy means 
and other data. The policy means are those variables over 
which the decision maker has some control and by which he 
seeks to influence the target variables. The other data 
are those variables important to the problem but over which 
the policy maker has no control. The second class consists 
of the endogenous variables. Included in this class are the 
target variables and the irrelevant variables. The target 
variables are those which the decision maker wishes to 
influence. The irrelevant variables are not instruments, 
other data, nor targets but nevertheless required to 
complete the structural model. 
The third element is the structural model, an economic 
model which defines the relationship which exist among all 
the variables of the system which the decision maker seeks 
to guide or influence. 
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V. ADAPTING THE TOOLS TO THE PH0BLSÎ4 
The fact that only a few tools were discussed in the 
preced ing section does not mean that the other tools 
used by economists have nothing to contribute to the study 
of educational institutions. Instead it simply reflects an 
intent to rely primarily on activity analysis, and 
particularly on linear programming, in the present study. 
Activity analysis has certain advantages which suggest 
that it might be useful here. Several of the variants of 
activity analysis, especially linear programming and to a 
lesser extent quadratic programming, are readily solvable 
by digital computers. Thus any problem formulated as a 
linear program can be rather easily solved. Moreover, the 
linear structural model common to.all activity analysis 
variants is capable of approximating many relationships that 
are not linear. These considerations alone provide some 
Incentive for the use of activity analysis. 
The linear model common to activity analysis and some 
other tools provides a format by which many relationships 
existing in educational institutions can be fairly easily 
represented. It is possible in many cases to treat 
educational outputs as being the result of several inter­
related processes each of which can be separately 
represented in an activity analysis model. As a result many 
of the coefficients in such a model may be simply related 
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to commonly observed numbers. This may allow easier 
explanation of the resulting model to educators and other 
interested persons. As a result educators may be able to 
provide constructive criticisms of educational models. 
Activity analysis is not without limitations. Perhaps 
the most serious limitation of activity analysis for 
educational models results from its inherent assumption of 
infinite divisibility of commodities and activities. Some 
of the outputs of educational institutions are not 
divisible and it is not sensible to believe that all of the 
processes of educational institutions are infinitely 
divisible. However, the assumption of divisibility may not 
cause much loss of realism in some cases. In those cases 
where noninteger solutions may be unacceptable it is 
possible to limit the solutions to integer solutions by 
using integer programming procedures. 
While activity analysis can be used in the formulation 
and solution of models of educational institutions, the 
elements of an activity analysis model of an educational 
institution need not correspond exactly to the elements of 
any problem faced by the institution. In order to make this 
point a bit more clearly, one approach to the translation of 
such a problem into an activity model will be presented 
below. 
The "commodities" (to use Koopmans* term) in such an 
activity analysis model should include all of the inputs. 
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outputs, and Intermediate products relevant to the problem, 
"Commodities" may include teaching, counseling, and other 
services which are somewhat intangible. In fact most of 
the commodities relevant to educational models are likely to 
be of this type. Any one commodity should, however, be 
fairly uniform in whatever qualitative aspects are considered 
important. This can be accomplished by treating a non­
uniform product as several different commodities. 
It is desirable that the objective function of a model 
be such that a solution to the model can be obtained fairly 
easily. It is therefore convenient to use a linear, 
quadratic or some other manageable type of objective function. 
It is likely that the preference function^ of the relevant 
decision maker is not that simple. It may also involve 
fixed or semi-fixed targets or it may involve a system of 
priorities. Therefore, it is convenient to have the 
objective function of the model approximate that part of the 
decision maker's preference function which can be approxi­
mated by some manageable function and to handle other aspects 
of the preference function in some other way. 
The activities of an activity analysis model 
^In this section in order to minimize confusion the 
term preference function will be reserved for the objective 
function of the institution's decision maker. The term 
objective function will refet to the objective function of 
the model of the institution. 
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provide the means by which the model approximates the 
production (and other) functions relevant to the educational 
institution. When there are only a few different ways of 
producing a given bundle of outputs and only a few different 
output combinations that can be produced from a given 
bundle of inputs, it may be possible to include an activity 
for each of these different methods of production. If the 
production function is not only continuous but also has 
continuous first derivatives and thus more closely resembles 
those described in many economics textbooks, the activities 
in the model are chosen to merely approximate the institu­
tion's production function. 
Besides approximating the production function and other 
functions related to the institution, the activities 
included in a model may often be chosen so as to incorporate 
non-technological restrictions on input combinations, output 
combinations or input-output combinations.^ These 
restrictions may be self-imposed and thus are properly 
called targets or they may be imposed by decision makers 
other than the one whose preference function is being 
^The sort of restriction most readily handled in this 
fashion are those which are homogeneous in the inputs and 
outputs and thus have the form E w I + ZIU 0 =(,=jOr =) 0, 
i i i j J J 
where the W.s and u specify the limiting combinations 
J J 
which are permitted. 
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maximized. 
It is convenient to consider the restrictions of 
activity analysis models as being divided into four groups 
three of which correspond fairly closely to the three groups 
of restrictions in problem 4.1. 
The first group of constraints consists of those which 
insure that the output levels are at least as great as their 
target levels. Three classes of targets, and therefore 
three sub-groups of constraints, can be distinguished. The 
first class of targets consists of fixed targets. These 
targets ordinarily give rise to constraints. A second class 
consists of those flexible targets which are arguments of 
the model's objective function. Since these targets ordinarily 
give rise to constraints of the form 
flex flex 
flex 
it may be possible to eliminate them by substituting Af^^ % 
flex 
for the objective function. On the other hand it 
may often be convenient to keep restrictions of this form. 
A third class consists of those targets (if any) which do not 
fall into either category. . There may be target levels which 
are arguments of the decision maker's preference function 
but which are neither fixed nor capable of being handled 
very well by making them arguments of the model's objective 
function. This sort of situation could arise if the decision 
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maker specified a list of desired target levels d^ 
(i = 1, . . n) for each of several variables (i = 1, . .n) 
and wanted to maximize K where k is the largest integer 
such that 
2 
(yj - &i) = 0. 
i=l 1 1 
The second group of constraints consists of those 
which insure that the rate of use of intermediate products 
does not exceed the rate of production of intermediate 
products. Since they are homogeneous constraints they can 
be eliminated but it may be convenient not to eliminate 
them,^ 
The third group of constraints consists of those which 
insure that the rate of use of primary factors or resources 
does not exceed the rate of supply. 
A fourth group of constraints has no counterpart in 
problem 1. These are the constraints, other than resource 
availability constraints,. imposed by persons, groups, or 
institutions other than the one whose preference function is 
being maximized. These groups may impose constraints on 
the amounts of resources which are available but these 
constraints have already been accounted for in the preceding 
iThe models constructed by Plessner and Fox (33) 
included virtually no intermediate product constraints. 
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group of constraints. In addition they may impose 
restrictions on output levels, on input combinations, on 
output combinations, or on input-output combinations. 
To the extent that these restrictions are restrictions 
on input ratios, output ratios, or on input-output ratios 
no additional constraints need be added to the model. 
Instead the satisfaction of these restrictions may be 
guaranteed by not including in the model any activity 
vectors which violate these constraints. Other sorts of 
restrictions may necessitate the use of additional constraints. 
VI, A MODEL OF A DEPARTMENT 
A relatively simple example may illustrate much of 
what has been discussed up to this point, and may also 
provide some indication of the usefulness (and perhaps the 
limitations) of this approach. In order to be somewhat 
concrete it will be assumed that the educational unit upon 
which this example is based is an economics department 
which is one of several departments in one of the colleges 
of a state supported university. It will be assumed that 
the department is engaged in research, undergraduate teaching 
and graduate teaching. In the production of its outputs 
it uses some resources, such as teaching budget funds, 
office space, and classroom space, which could readily be 
used by other departments in the university. It uses some 
resources, such as the services of its faculty members, 
the time of its students, and its research funds, which 
could not as readily be diverted to other departments 
within the university. It also uses certain inputs, such 
as the instruction which its students receive from other 
departments, which are outputs of other departments. 
Only a very complicated formulation could hope to 
include all of the features which might be desired in the 
model of an individual department. In order to keep the 
problem manageable several simplifications will be made. 
A model of a department could be designed to find the 
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optimum levels of both Inputs and outputs. This sort of 
model would be relevant for some of the decisions which 
are made about educational institutions. A state 
legislator, or anyone else who is concerned with the amounts 
of resources to allocate to an educational institution, 
would need to take that sort of view of the matter. 
University officials who argue for larger university budgets 
must be doing so, at least implicitly, on the basis of a 
model which allows both outputs and inputs to be variable. 
For some purposes, however, it may be realistic to ass'ume 
that some of the input levels can not easily be increased. 
The departmental model to be presented here will treat some 
of the available input levels as being fixed and will limit 
the arguments of the departmental preference function 
primarily to output levels. 
If only one educational product is considered, there 
are usually at least two sorts of changes that could be 
made. One way of changing the output is to change the 
level or rate of output. The other way involves improving 
or worsening the product. In a very comprehensive model 
both sorts of changes should be allowed. However, both the 
structural part of the model and the preference function are 
more difficult to formulate if both sorts of change are 
allowed. If some rating system existed which could provide 
a way of weighting each of the variants of a product, 
formulation of the preference function would not be too 
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difficult. Unfortunately, many of the rating systems 
which exist (or might be invented) are at best only ordinal. 
Cartter (10) has rated the effectiveness of the economics 
graduate programs offered by several universities. If an 
economics department could choose among producing (a) two 
Ph.D's like those granted by University X, (b) one like 
those granted by University Y, or (c) three like those 
granted by University Z, it is not obvious that these 
alternatives should always be ordered (a), (b), (c) even if 
Cartter*s ratings of the respective graduate programs had 
been 1.50, 2.50 and 0.75. 
Production of most educational outputs does not 
occur instantaneously but requires a certain amount, usually 
several years, of time. Thus some of the decisions which 
will affect output levels in a given year must often be 
made several years in advance. As a result these decisions 
must often be made on the basis of less than complete 
information. Thus a completely realistic model of an 
educational institution should treat both time and uncertainty 
explicitly. However, the departmental model to be presented 
will not give them explicit treatment. Instead the model 
will assume that decisions are made in the face of essentially 
complete certainty. The model will also be essentially 
static. 
Many educational institutions are engaged in teaching 
and research during the summer months as well as during the 
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rest of the year. The model to be presented here will not 
be concerned with the simmer months. 
The outputs to be considered in the model were 
mentioned in a general way at the start of this section. 
A more detailed description of the outputs is presented in 
Table 52. 
There are several groups which might influence the 
preference function of the sort of department outlined 
above. These groups could include (a) higher level decision 
makers in the university or in the state government, (b) 
persons, firms, or agencies who supply research funds, (c) 
students, and (d) faculty members. The influence of each of 
•these groups upon a department is not transmitted exclusively 
through its influence on the departments' preference function. 
Each of these groups supplies a portion of the inputs used 
by the department. Presumably the quantity of inputs which 
each group" is willing to supply depends at least in part 
on its evaluation of the compensation (including non­
monetary compensation) which it receives in return. Faculty 
members may seek employment elsewhere if they become too 
dissatisfied with the combination of workload, pay, and 
environment which a particular department offers them. 
Potential graduate students may tend to seek admission to 
other universities (or departments) if the graduate program 
offered by the university in a particular discipline does 
not seem adequate to them. Suppliers of research funds may 
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reduce the size of the grants made to a department if they 
expect results which from their point of view are 
deficient in quajitity or quality. The amount of resources 
which college deans and other higher level educational 
decision makers supply to a department may depend on the 
types and amount's of outputs which they expect that the 
department will produce. Thus each of the groups supplying 
inputs is effectively imposing one or more constraints on 
the department. 
Since each group's influence may be regarded as being 
felt via constraints on the department there is no clear-cut 
justification for allowing any of them to influence the 
department's preference function. However, for the purposes 
of this study it will be assumed that the preferences of 
higher level decision makers in the university and in the 
state government have the greatest influence on the 
department's preference function. This assumption is 
motivated in part by a desire to give more explicit treatment 
in later chapters to the resource allocation decisions of 
college deans and other university officials. 
It will be assumed that the state's preference function, 
if it could be known, would tend to give larger weights 
(or higher priorities) to those programs which serve the 
state, its people and its industries. One goal which seems 
to enjoy a rather high priority in most states is the under­
graduate education of state residents. Inasmuch as the 
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residence and high school record requirements are often 
specified in some detail by state statutes or by regulations 
created by its board of regents, it appears that the intent 
is (apart from the effect of periodic, and usually minor, 
tuition and other changes) to largely allow the private 
demand for education to regulate undergraduate enrollments 
and thus the rate of Bachelor's degree production. An 
English economist, Mark Blaug (5)» has observed that as the 
private demand-for-education curve shifts to the right 
over time, the educational system in the United States 
tends to shift its supply curve to the right so as to 
maintain the same "price" and thus keep excess demand for 
education (at that "price") nearly equal to zero. The "price" 
variable which Blaug uses is the rate of return on bonds 
divided by the private rate of return on education. 
Other goals also seem to receive some emphasis in 
most states. A desire to support its economic and social 
growth is likely to cause the state to give greater weights 
to those teaching, research, and extension programs which 
train persons for jobs more or less peculiar to that state, 
which study the productive, economic, and social processes 
of the state, or which provide technical assistance and 
information to the state's production and community groups. 
Although the motives are less clear, many states also 
attach positive weights to some outputs which (a) support 
regional, national, or international goals, (b) benefit 
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other states, other regions, or other nations, or (c) 
contribute to the maintenance and development of scientific 
(and other) disciplines. 
If the economics department's preference function is 
consistent with these goals it may involve both fixed and 
flexible targets. The fixed targets would seem to be most 
relevant for undergraduate output levels. The levels at 
which these targets are set depend upon the actions of 
students. Some other outputs can be subject to flexible 
target levels. It will be assumed that the preference 
function is approximately linear in the flexible targets. 
The fixed target levels which are to be used are 
shown in Table 62. The weights associated with the flexible 
targets are presented in Table 63. The target levels 
associated with outputs are all non-positive,^ 
Some of the inputs used by the economics department 
are regarded as being specific to that particular department. 
It will be supposed that the department has been authorized 
twenty-five faculty positions, one of which is occupied by 
the department chairman. He is assumed to devote half of 
^The choice of non-positive values rather than non-
negative values was mostly just a matter of convenience. 
It is somewhat easier to formulate and check a model if 
one type of inequality is chosen for all constraints. For 
maximizing linear programs it has become conventional to 
use "less than or equal" Inequalities, 
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his effort to administrative functions which affect the 
department as a whole and which can not readily be 
allocated to particular outputs or activities. It is 
assumed that the authorized positions are distributed among 
three broad areas of interest or specialization within the 
economics discipline. 
The department is assumed to have sources of research 
funds which support the areas of specialization represented 
by its faculty. 
The department is also assumed able to attract graduate 
students interested in obtaining Master's or Ph,D. degrees 
in economics. It is assumed that certain numbers of these 
students are willing and able, if necessary, to provide 
their o\m. support. They may have savings which they would 
be willing to invest in their graduate education. They 
may already be employed by, or be able to obtain employment 
with, other academic or service departments of the university. 
They may have, or be able to obtain, graduate fellowships. 
They may be employed, or can obtain employment, in the local 
community. Other students may be attracted by offering them 
research or teaching assistantships or by offering them 
employment as instructors. 
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Table ^4. (commodities^ e^o through e57) describes 
these inputs and Table 62 indicates the amounts of each of 
these inputs assumed available to the department. 
Some of the inputs used by the department could readily 
be used by other departments in the university. The amounts 
of these inputs which are made available to the economics 
department depend upon the allocation decisions made by the 
college dean and other university officials in the same way 
that the amounts of other inputs which are made available 
depend upon decisions made by students, suppliers of 
research funds, and others. 
The size of the departments' teaching budget is 
assumed to be decided by the college dean. The budget 
concept used in this model differs somewhat from the concept 
ordinarily used by educators. First, truly fixed liabilities 
are not included in the budget as used in the model. The 
major liabilities which are considered fixed for the 
purposes of this model are one-half of the department 
chairman's salary and the salary for limited-secretarial 
assistance for the chairman. If the department chairman's 
^The term "commodity" may sound a jarring note in this 
context. It is used here in the comprehensive sense of 
Koopmans (28, pp. 33- 97) who classifies all the products 
into final commodities, intermediate commodities, and 
primary commodities. 
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contribution to the outputs of the department had been 
considered more explicitly the truly fixed liabilities 
would be nearly zero. 
Secondly, even though the department's faculty is 
assumed to be fixed in number, the teaching budget need 
not cover the entire amount of faculty salaries nor any 
other fixed proportion of faculty salaries. The proportion 
of faculty salaries included in the teaching budget is 
determined endogenously. At least two factors which tend to 
Justify, in practice, the "charging" of a certain proportion 
of each faculty member* s salary to a given budget are not 
relevant here. These factors are uncertainty about the 
amounts of project research funds that will be forthcoming 
and the necessity to fulfill contractual obligations made 
to faculty members. By charging all faculty salaries to 
budgets whose sizes are known with certainty, it is possible 
to insure that all faculty salaries will be paid. The 
first factor, uncertainty, is ignored in this model. The 
second factor is handled by including other restrictions 
which insure that faculty members are paid. 
Office space and classroom use are included among the 
inputs allocated to the department by the college dean. 
Instruction furnished to economics graduate students 
by supporting departments and teaching resources furnished 
to the economics department by supporting departments are 
also regarded in this model as being inputs allocated to 
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the department by the college dean. 
Table 5^ (commodities e38 through e^5) describes the 
inputs allocated to the department by the college dean. 
Table 62 indicates the amounts of each of these inputs 
which the college dean is assumed to have allocated to the 
department. 
Table 53 describes the intermediate products 
considered by the model. 
It has been assumed that the numbers of faculty 
members of various specializations or types which the 
department is authorized to employ is fixed. It seems safe 
to presume that the supply function which the department 
faces for faculty members of the ith type includes as 
arguments not only salary levels (plus fringe benefits) 
but also factors such as the amounts of teaching and 
research required, and the office space per faculty member. 
It is also likely to include as arguments several variables 
over which the department chairman has no control. 
Let the ith supply function be written 
qj_ = fj_(Zj_) , where z^ is the vector of arguments 
which the department chairman can control. Let q^ be the 
number authorized of ith type faculty and define the set 
Qi i^| ^ i - i^}-
The department chairman is thus limited to Zj_ vectors which 
belong to the set 
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1^ = f"^ ( Qi) ={ Zi j fi(zi) = • 
For the purposes of the present study will be 
assumed to have seven components; (1) salary (and benefits) 
paid from the teaching budget, (2) salary (and benefits) 
paid from a research budget, (3) proportion of faculty 
member's time allocated to research, (4) amount of under­
graduate teaching per year per faculty member, (5) amount 
of graduate teaching per year per faculty member, (6) 
amount of office space per faculty member, (?) amount of 
time spent on academic or professional committees and 
other "public service" functions per year per faculty member. 
It will be assumed that the terms on which research funds 
have been obtained require that the proportion of a faculty 
members time allocated to research supported by a particular 
research budget must be at least as great as the proportion 
of his salary which is paid out of that budget. It will also 
be assumed that the amount of "public service" time required 
per faculty member is proportional to the amount of time 
spent in teaching functions per faculty member (one-eighth 
of such time was the figure chosen.) Other restrictions may 
be imposed by the college dean or other decision makers. 
Define the set Q* ^ as the set of vectors which both belong to 
Q ^ and satisfy the restrictions imposed by other decision 
makers. 
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f J • If Q is convex, elements of Q can be used to 
construct activity vectors for the model. Several activity 
vectors which for the purposes of this model are assumed 
feasible are presented in Table 6l. For the particular 
activities which have been chosen the total salary demanded 
by faculty members is Independent of the amounts of various 
services rendered. For these activities the total workload 
per faculty members "adds up" to the equivalent of a workload 
of 12 "contact" hours per week. Activities satisfying these 
two requirements were chosen only to make the model easier 
to understand. 
It is assumed that any faculty member is capable of 
teaching economic principles and that any faculty member is 
also as willing to supply one unit of teaching time for 
economic principles teaching as to supply one unit for 
undergraduate teaching in the faculty member's specialty. 
These assumptions are incorporated into the model by the 
first three "transfer" activities included in Table 6l, 
These assumptions could have been incorporated by means of 
activities having the same form as the other faculty 
allocation activities, but to do this, would have required the 
use of six activities rather than three. 
The fourth "transfer" activity in Table 6l allows those 
"specialty one" faculty members who enjoy project research 
support to participate in non-project research. As in the 
case of the other "transfer" activités its use was motivated 
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by the fact that Its use permitted using fewer activities. 
It will be assumed that as many secretarial and other 
clerical personnel as are desired can be employed at some 
"going wage" rate. The specific assumptions about the 
wage rate, office space requirements, and so forth for 
secretarial and clerical personnel are incorporated in 
the activities shown in Table 60. 
For the purposes of the present study it is assumed 
that additional (beyond those ready, willing, and able to 
obtain their own support) graduate students can be obtained 
by appointing them as one-half time research assistants, 
teaching assistants, or as instructors. It is assumed that 
as many students as are desired can be obtained at the 
"going rate" for the various types of appointments. The 
activities which incorporate these assumptions are presented 
in Table 59* The first activity (e43) is designed to allow 
the use, if necessary, of instructors as teaching assistants. 
Eight of the other activities (e44, e46, e47, e^8, e5l, 
e53» and e^6) are "pure" appointments in the sense that they 
represent appointments as research assistants, teaching 
assistants or instructors. The other six are weighted 
averages of these eight except that the number of years 
required to obtain a degree (the inverse of the absolute value 
of the elements in rows e5l and e52) are less than the same 
weighted averages of the numbers of years required for 
"pure" appointments, This is to recognize the f%ct that a 
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student.who teaches during the time that he studies for 
his Ph.D. is likely to require longer to complete the 
degree than if he were on a research assistantship for the 
last year or so of his program. It was also assumed that 
a student who is on a research assistantship during his 
entire Ph.D. program is likely to be able to finish sooner 
than if he had taught during some portion of his program. 
The next activities to be considered are teaching 
activities. The most important coefficients in each of 
these activity vectors are those which specify the marginal 
class sizes. Several factors may affect class sizes. The 
first factor affecting class sizes is the unit of measure­
ment of faculty teaching inputs. Since this unit has been 
defined as the amount of faculty teaching inputs needed to 
teach one section, the class sizes used help to complete the 
unit of measure adopted for teaching inputs. Snodgrass 
(36, p. 322) has estimated that one section of a certain 
3 credit hour, semester length course would, if adequately 
taught, require 230 hours of faculty time plus 7 additional 
hours for each student enrolled in the course. Since the 
faculty inputs required per section of that course and, 
presumably, any course depend upon the class size, 
specifying the class sizes to be permitted for planning 
purposes helps to establish the size of a unit of teaching 
inputs. 
A second factor affecting permissible class sizes is 
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the effect of class size on the quality of instruction 
received by the students enrolled in the courses. The class 
sizes which will allow adequate instruction are influenced 
by many factors including course content and the nature of 
available classrooms. 
Scheduling and coordination considerations also may 
affect class sizes. On the one hand, as enrollment increases 
it may be necessary to increase the number of sections of 
a course more rapidly than would otherwise be required in 
order to insure that the course is offered at enough 
different times during the year so that all students 
required to take the course can fit it into their class 
schedules. On the other hand, even if enrollment is low 
some courses may need to be taught at least annually or 
biennially in order to maintain an undergraduate curriculum 
or a graduate degree program. In such a case average class 
sizes may be rather low and the number of sections offered 
per year need not increase as fast in response to increased 
enrollment as would otherwise be required. 
Two activities are included in the model for each of 
the (three) undergraduate course areas, other than economic 
principles. One of each of these pairs of activities permits 
all of the teaching to be done by faculty members. The other 
member of each pair of activities allows a portion of the 
teaching to be done by graduate instructors under the 
supervision of faculty members teaching in the same area. 
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Faculty administrative inputs necessary to supervise 
the teaching program are not treated separately. Part of 
these are furnished by the department chairman and thus 
under the approach adopted here are not accounted for at 
all. Those which are contributed by other faculty members 
are taken into account by adding 0,1 units to the faculty 
teaching inputs required per section. Thus for each of 
these activities the faculty input coefficient plus the 
graduate instructor input coefficient equals 1.1 rather 
than 1.0. 
One activity was included in the model for each of the 
three graduate course areas. It was assumed that admin­
istrative inputs per graduate section must be 0.05 units. 
Thus the faculty inputs required per section equal 1,05 
units of teaching Inputs instead of the one unit that might 
be expected. 
For economics principles teaching it was assumed that 
scheduling and other coordination difficulties preclude 
average class sizes greater than one hundred, but that other­
wise large lecture sections of up to 220 could be permitted. 
Thus if the oCj^*s are the class sizes associated with six 
ways of teaching economics principles and S is the enrollment 
in principles, two of the constraints involving the teaching 
activities for economics principles are given by 
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Six activities were originally considered. Three of these 
involved class sizes of 220. The six activities actually 
included in the model were based on the six efficient basic 
solutions to the small linear program defined above. For 
the original activities faculty administrative requirements 
were set at 0.1 unit for sections smaller than 6o and at 
0.25 unit for larger sections. The larger sections would 
involve the use of the services of teaching assistants. 
Activities were included in the model for thesis 
supervision and the advising of students. Although these 
activities have the same form as other teaching activities 
the "class size" coefficients have somewhat different meanings. 
In the case of advising activities the "class size" 
coefficient represents the number of advisees which a faculty 
member could advise if his classroom teaching assignments 
were reduced by one section per quarter. For thesis 
supervision the "class size" coefficient is one third times 
the number of hours of thesis credit which could be super­
vised per unit of teaching inputs. The input coefficients 
for the thesis supervision activities indicate the relative 
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contributions by each of the several groups of faculty 
members to thesis supervision (and to other functions 
performed by students' supervisary committees). 
Tables 57 and 58 present the teaching activities 
included in the model. Table 57 presents the undergraduate 
teaching and advising activities. Table 58 presents the 
graduate teaching, advising, and thesis supervision 
activities. 
Degree producing activities will be considered next. 
Although an undergraduate activity has been included in this 
group of activities, it is not, strictly speaking, a degree 
activity since it is concerned only with the instruction 
and advising which an economics major receives from the 
economics department. 
Since most economics majors (both graduate and under­
graduate) are not faced with the task of completing a 
rigid list of courses it might seem that several activities 
should be included for each type of degree. However, much 
of this freedom resides with the student and not with the 
department. Furthermore, that which resides with the 
department seems more likely to be used for the student's 
benefit rather than to reduce the cost of a degree. Thus, 
at least for this model, determining the average curriculum 
for a particular degree is not an optimization problem but 
a prediction problem. 
It is assumed that the required numbers of credit hours 
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are 30, 45. and 6J for an undergraduate major, a Master's 
degree, and a Ph.D. degree (for a person who already has 
a Master's degree), respectively. For the model these 
requirements have been set at 36, 51, and 81, respectively, 
to reflect the fact that students often take more than the 
minimum numbers of courses required and to reflect the fact 
that attrition rates are not zero. The instructional input 
requirements for the activities are specified in terms of 
numbers of (3 credit hour) courses. Table 56 presents the 
degree activities. 
The only activities remaining to be discussed are 
research activities. The research output per faculty man 
year undoubtedly depends upon the amounts of other research 
inputs which are combined with the faculty. Several 
activities are included for each area of research in order 
to allow differing amounts of other inputs to be combined 
with each faculty research year. Table 55 presents these 
activities. 
The solution vector obtained by maximizing the 
objective function is presented in Table 64. While the 
solution is not unique, the final output levels are not 
very sensitive to minor changes in the objective function or 
to minor changes in the b vector. 
The dual solution vector is presented in Table 65. 
The solution to the dual is quite sensitive to minor changes 
in the b vector. 
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The sensitivity of the dual solution is, of course, due 
to the fact that the model does not allow much substitution 
among certain of the inputs. In many cases it is realistic 
to believe that only limited substitution is possible, but 
it may be that the model presented in this chapter under­
states the substitution that could be permitted. 
The model allows no substitution on the "supply" side 
(i.e. the b vector is fixed). Thus it is possible that the 
model also understates the substitution that could occur 
on the supply side. In some cases suppliers of resources 
may react to the "shadow prices" of these resources by 
supplying more of resources for which the shadow prices seem 
to them to be "too high" and less of resources for which the 
shadow prices seem to be "too low". This sort of reaction 
cannot be expected, however, unless the department's objective 
function is consistent with that of the particular resource 
supplies being considered. 
For the example considered in this chapter the 
department's objective function was assumed to be consistent 
with that of the college dean. Therefore, it may be that the 
college dean would (or at least could) use the "shadow 
prices" on the resources which he supplies to guide his 
allocation of these resources. This possibility along with 
other aspects of the decision making process relevant to a 
college will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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VII. A MODEL OP A SMALL COLLEGE 
Most of the productive processes relevant to a college 
model are supervised by the various departments in the 
college. One approach to the construction of a model of a 
college is thus to first construct models of its individual 
departments. The economics department of a university is 
likely to be found in a college of the Arts and Sciences 
type. Such a college may include twenty or more departments. 
To attempt to consider each of these departments, even if in 
no greater detail than the economics department was 
considered, would result in a very large college model. If 
such a model were designed to aid in the management of an 
actual college and if it could be based on a careful 
investigation of each of these departments, construction of 
such a model might be justified. However, for the purposes 
of this study, a smaller model can both serve to illustrate 
some of the features which a larger model might have and to 
provide some understanding of the source of some of the 
constraints found in the departmental model presented earlier. 
The college model to be presented here will be based on a 
hypothetical college which is presumed to include only an 
economics department and the departments (A and 3) which 
furnish relatively large amount of (graduate level) service 
teaching to economics department graduate students. 
The relationships assumed to exist between the activity 
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levels and net input (of commodities) levels can, for the 
ith department, be expressed as Aj_ . The coefficients 
of the matrix (department A) and Ab (department b) can be 
found in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
Tables 3> 4, and 5 list and describe those commodities 
which are considered to be final products, intermediate 
products, and primary products, respectively from the point 
of view of department A. Tables 16, 17, and 18 list and 
describe those commodities which are considered final 
products, intermediate products, and primary products, 
respectively, from the point of view of department B. 
Tables 6 through 11 present the activities included in 
the model of department A. Tables 19 through 24 present the 
activities included in the model of department B. 
Not all of the outputs of a college need be regarded as 
outputs of one of its departments. One such output which 
will be considered is the Bachelor's degree. It may be 
inappropriate to consider Bachelor's degrees as outputs of 
the individual departments since only a fraction of the 
training which a student must receive in order to be awarded 
that degree occurs within his major department. It may be 
relevant, however, to consider Bachelor's degrees as outputs 
of a college since (at least for a college of the Arts and 
Sciences type) most of the training required occurs within 
the college. 
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It will be assumed that the major variables (such as 
entrance requirements and tuition rates) which influence 
the numbers of persons seeking B.S. degrees are set by-
higher level decision makers and that the college will 
educate any undergraduate student who chooses to enroll and 
who maintains a satisfactory grade average. It will also 
be assumed that the college does not influence the distribu­
tion of undergraduate students among the various majors 
offered by the college. This is equivalent to adopting 
fixed target levels for B.S. degree outputs. The model could 
include an activity for each different major offered by the 
college. The activity level vector Z associated with these 
activities would be required to satisfy the restriction 
DZ = d where d is a vector composed of the rates at which 
B.S. degrees are to be awarded in each of the various majors 
and is a diagonal matrix composed of the levels at 
which each of the B.S. degree producing activities must be 
operated in order to produce one B.S. degree of each type 
per year. For the purposes of the model to be presented 
here the activity level vector and the corresponding activity 
vectors will be collapsed into a scalar, Zq,, and a single 
activity vector respectively by lettingI'Z = and 1*d = 
bi. 
This effectively means that the product "Bachelor's 
degrees" produced by the college now consists of 77^ percent 
of ith major Bachelors degrees. The coefficients for the 
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Bachelor's degree producing activity are shom in Table 29, 
Appendix C. 
Although the actual method of handling this matter 
would depend upon the organization of the university and 
upon the physical arrangement of the campus buildings, it 
will be assumed that the college dean is assigned a block 
of small classrooms for use by the teaching activities of 
his college. Even though the college dean has control of a 
classroom for l68 hours a week, it is clear that each class­
room can not yield l68 classroom units per quarter^ (i.e. 
one classroom is not sufficient to allow the conducting of 
56 sections per quarter of courses meeting 3 hours each per 
week). A more feasible rate of classroom use would seem to 
be about 30 hours per week, but this certainly cannot be 
taken as an upper bound. 
For the purposes of this model it will be assumed that 
there is some slight cost associated with increasing the 
rate of classroom use per classroom. It will be assumed that 
for rates of use up_ to 25 hours per week (75 units per year) 
these costs are already accounted for in the teaching 
activities o_f the college. Beyond this rate of use it will 
be assumed that coordination problems are encountered. That 
^Classroom units defined in Tables 5, 18, or 5^. 
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is, classes may need on the average to be scheduled 
farther away from the offices of the department supplying 
the instructor, classes may need to be scheduled at other 
than prime teaching times, or classes may have (on the 
average) to be conducted in classrooms less suited to the 
method of presentation most useful for the subject matter. 
This will be assumed to increase slightly the average 
salary demanded by staff members. It is reasonable to 
believe janitorial and maintenance costs per classroom may 
increase slightly. Finally the cost of achieving a feasible 
allocation of classroom use among the teaching activities 
of the college can be expected to increase slightly. 
This situation will be incorporated in the model by 
including a classroom allocation "department" in the model. 
This department will be assumed to have the function not only 
of allocating periods of classroom use but also of compen­
sating other elements of the university for increased costs 
incurred as a result of choosing use rates in excess of 25 
hours per week. 
The activities of the classroom allocation department 
are shown in Table , 
There are several ways of arranging the elements of the 
model. One way would be to group the constraints into three 
groups corresponding to those commodities which are regarded 
as final products, intermediate products, and primary pro­
ducts from the point of view of the college. Although this 
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method of presenting the model will not be especially 
useful for later sections, this will be the first way of 
presenting the model. 
With the exception of the elements of the "c" and *'b" 
vectors, all of the coefficients of the model have already 
been presented. They will not be presented again. Instead 
cross references will be provided between the commodity 
and activity numbers used in the college model and the 
commodity and activity numbers,used in the departmental 
models. These cross references are to be found in Tables 
30 through 32 and Table 33» respectively. 
The restrictions faced by the college are shovm in 
Table 3^. No restriction is placed upon the amounts of 
instruction which the college can obtain from departments 
in other colleges. Instead an opportunity cost of 0.12 per 
instructional unit is assigned. It is assumed that the 
impact of this instructional load is fairly widely 
distributed among the departments in the rest of the 
university, (if this is the case a constant opportunity cost 
may not be too bad an approximation. If the impact were 
not widely distributed, as would be the case if one depart­
ment supplied all of this instruction the opportunity cost 
per unit would probably depend upon the number of units of 
instruction supplied.) Teaching resources supplied by other 
colleges are treated in the same manner. An opportunity cost 
of 1.5 per unit of teaching is assumed. 
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Table 35 presents the objective function weights 
associated with flexible targets. Although it is possible 
that these weights could have been derived from the college 
dean's own preference function, it will be assumed that 
they are based on guidelines or weights supplied by the 
university president. The university president may have 
specified the weights to be associated with each individual 
output. On the other hand, he nay have established weights 
on contributions made to the states' economy, to 
ameliorating the social problems of the state, to national 
scientific disciplines, and to other objectives, and asked 
the college dean to use these weights as a basis for 
computing the weights for each sort of output produced by the 
college (with the exception of those outputs whose levels 
have been made fixed targets). 
the model just described will be called version one and will 
be represented by 7.1. 
(7.1) max Xq 
iNot all of the restrictions were presented in the 
model as less than or equal restrictions. It does no harm 
to discuss the model as though it had the form of 7.1 since 
if it were really necessary to do so the model could be 
put in the form of 7*1. 
To facilitate discussion in the following sections 
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For most of the discussion which follows it will be 
convenient to have a version of the model which has no 
non-departmental activities. In the discussion presented 
above a separate "department" was "created" to manage the 
allocation of classrooms. The only other activity in the 
model which is not an activity of an academic department is 
the activity associated with Bachelors* degree production 
(column 48 of A^). The main reason for including it in 
version one was to help clarify the effect of the 
assumptions which were made about the determinants of the 
levels of undergraduate outputs. The assumptions which 
were made allow this activity to be easily eliminated from 
the model, 
Version one can be rewritten as 
subject to _ _ ^ 
•^ c c^ ~ ^ c " -^ c^ B^ c^ S 
where is the 48th column of A^, 
Aq is Aq after removing the 48th column, 
CQ is CQ after removing the 48th element of C^, 
^c48 the 48th element of 
and is after removal of 
Since it is required that x^^g = 250, version one 
can be rewritten as 
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max XQ 
where - (250) A,,43, 
Version two could then be obtained by rearranging the 
elements of so that the matrix A which results has the 
When put in this form the first constraints in the model are 
group of constraints includes those affecting only department 
A, the third group of constraints includes those affecting 
only department B, and so forth. The first group of activities 
1a1though this will be. spelled out in more detail later 
it may be worthwhile to mention these common constraints 
here. The common constraints relate to teaching budget 
funds, space resources (office space and classroom use) 
and to those commodities (teaching services and instruction) 
which are produced by one department partly for use by one 
or more of the other departments in the college. 
form 
those which affect more than one department.^ The next 
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(columns) includes the activities of department A, the 
second group includes the activities o'f department B, and 
so on. The vectors c^, Xq and are subjected to the same 
sort of rearrangement. The resulting vectors have the 
forms 
Xr 
C = 
^a 
Cb 
Cd 
X = 
a 
^b 
%d 
Xc 
and b = 
^b 
bd 
^e 
The easiest way to obtain version two of the model is 
to start directly from the departmental models. Tables 36 
and 37 provide cross references between the commodity and 
activity numbers, used in version two of the college model 
and the commodity and activity numbers used in the models 
of the individual department. Table 38 presents the b 
vector relevant to version two. Table 39 presents the 
objective function weights for version two. 
Version two will be represented by 7.2, 
(7.2) max c'x 
X€X 
X = -^ x ( Ax = y = b , X = (^  
This section will examine the feasibility of alternative 
decision making arrangements. It will deal with one 
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arrangement under which the college dean selects the level 
at which each activity is to be operated, and with other 
arrangements under which the college dean influences the 
activity levels less directly. The first arrangement will 
be called complete centralization,^ and the other arrange­
ments will be called partial decentralization. 
Not too much can be said about which decision making 
arrangement is best since many of the factors which are 
relevant to that sort of determination will not be treated 
2 
very carefully. It will be assumed however, that the ith 
department has more complete information about the elements 
of ÂjL, , and b^. It is clear that this should definitely 
be the case for Â^, and since the coefficients in these 
matrices are related to processes supervised by the depart­
ment. It is equally clear that this should be so for those 
elements of bj^ which are associated with input restrictions 
faced only by department i. It is not as clear that this 
should be so for those elements of b. which are associated 
—1 
with output restrictions. In the model presented above 
these elements (i.e. those elements of b^ associated with 
output restrictions) depend upon undergraduate enrollments 
^The first arrangement represents complete centraliza­
tion only with respect to those activity level decisions 
explicitly included in the model. 
^Some of these factors are discussed in (30). 
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within the college and university and upon graduate enrollment 
in the rest of the university. 
The information about enrollments is likely to fee known 
by the college dean, but it is also the sort of information 
that is widely disseminated. The department chairman could 
probably estimate the output levels required by these 
enrollments at least as easily and accurately as the college 
dean could. It was already assumed above that the college 
dean formulates the weights for the college objective 
function.^ 
A decision making scheme will be considered effective 
if, under that scheme, the college dean can be assured that 
activity level decisions will be reached which will ensure 
(a) satisfaction of all commodity constraints (both those 
impared by suppliers of resources and those which result 
from the establishment of fixed targets) and (b) (subject to 
the commodity constraints) maximization of the college's 
objective function. For each scheme, the college dean will 
be assumed to be using two sets of instruments. It will be 
assumed that he uses one set of instruments to guide the 
operation of his college, and that he uses the other set in 
the planning phase in order to determine the optimum values 
for the first set of instruments. Thus the second set of 
^This assumption could easily be modified. This will 
be done in Chapter 8. 
86 
Instruments serves to direct an information gathering process. 
These two sets of instruments may be identical, but they 
need not be. Since educational institutions are planned 
institutions in much the same sense that socialist and 
certain other types of economics are planned, it may make 
sense to use one set of instruments to form the plan and 
another to guide its fulfillment. 
Since two sets of instruments are involved, it is 
convenient to divide the discussion into two parts. In the 
first part, different sets of operational control instruments 
will be considered effective if there exist values for that 
set of instruments which will insure that the constraints in 
the college model are satisfied and that, subject to those 
constraints, the college objective function will be maximized. 
In the second part of the discussion, alternative sets of 
information gathering instruments will be examined. These 
sets of instruments will be considered effective for a 
given set of operational control instruments if they can be 
used in such a way as to Insure that optimum values can be 
obtained for that set of operational control instruments. 
A decision making scheme will thus be considered 
effective if its set of operational control instruments is 
effective and its set of information gathering instruments 
is effective for the operational control instruments chosen. 
Under complete centralization the college dean would be 
expected to use the elements of the vector x^ (or in the 
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case of version two, the vector x) as his set of operational 
control instruments. This set of instruments is, by 
definition, an effective set of operational control 
instruments If an effective set exists.^ 
Under complete decentralization it might be expected 
that the college dean's set of operational control instru­
ments would include only prices. That is, he would not set 
any activity levels nor would he establish any departmental 
input or output quotas. The completely decentralized case 
will not be considered here; the discussion will be confined 
to schemes involving only partial decentralization. 
One set of operational control instruments to be 
considered will include one instrument for each activity in 
version two of the model and one instrument for each 
constraint in version two which affects more than one depart­
ment. All of the instruments would be prices. 
If this set of instruments were adopted, the college 
dean would select values for each of the elements in the 
vectors 
lit will be assumed throughout the rest of this chapter 
that both versions of the model are solvable. That is, it 
will be assumed that there exists at least one feasible 
vector Xq such that 
c<t Xq = max c^ x^ 
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M' 
I " ! 
_ I . I and IT, and then ask 
I ' I 
the 1th department chairman to select activity levels 
which would solve 7.3» 
(7.3) max^^ 
=-[=1131 %1 = ?!, Ai %i = = c} 
The elements ofy^ are the weights or prices which 
the 1th department chairman would be asked to associate with 
the various activities of his department; Tf is a vector of 
weights to be associated with the elements of the vector 
7^, and is a vector of the amounts "used" by the ith 
department of those commodities which also affect at least 
one other department. 
This set of instruments can be considered effective 
only if there esrist vectorsand IT such that any solution 
to 7.4 must also solve 7.2. 
^Throughout the remainder of this chapter, it will 
be convenient to use the more conventional numerical 
subscripts rather than alphabetical subscripts. 
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(7.4) max (^- A» Tf ) ' x 
xeX 
— ~ - b, X = 10-
wnere &1 
Û = 
â2 
o and b = Ib^ 
o Av-J 
Although in all oases there will exist sets of values 
for the elements of/^and 7T ^hioh are at least as good, the 
most obvious values for/4 and jf are obtained by setting 
y^= c and 11= v . It is clear that if these values are 
chosen, then any solution to 7.2 is also a solution to 7*4, 
but it is also clear that some of the solutions to 7*4 may 
not be solutions to 7,2. This is due to the fact that some 
of the solutions to 7inay not be feasible solutions to 7*2. 
There may be particular problems (i.e. particular values 
for the elements of A, b, c,) for which there would exist 
values^ and TT such that every solution to is also a 
solution to 7.2 but there are also problems for which this 
is not so. 
— 
-^V is that part of the dual solution vector V = 
which correspond to those constraints affecting more ^ -
than one department. 
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Consider a case in which there are two departments, one 
of which produces an output, say instruction of some sort, 
which is used by the other department. Suppose further that 
the resources used to produce this output could also be used 
in the production of other outputs. As a numerical example 
consider the problem in which; 
-^ 1 - 2 , ^  - 1 , A2 - fO - l], Ag - [1 1] 
 ^— 0 * b"j — 1 , bg — 3 
7.2 would then become: 
max 3%]^ + X21 
subject to 
2Xi - X22 0 
^1 = 1 
2^1 **" 2^2 - 3 
7.4 becomes; 
max(/^ - ZlDx-i •'•-^21^21 •*" ^2 "^^^2^ 
subject to 
Xq_ é 1 
^21 + ^ 22 = 3 
xi, %21, ^ 22 = 0 
The primal and dual solutions to 7*2 are 
Xl = 1 V = 1 
primal: Xg^ = 1 
%22 = 2 
dual : = 1 
5 2 = 1  
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The "best" values for^ and Tf must satisfy 
(/^ - 2 IT) > 0 
-^ 21 ~ ^ 22 + "H" ) î* 0 
7T > 0 
The solutions to 7.4 are given by 
X]_ = 1 
^21 ^  3% 
^22 ~ 3(1 - %) 
0 = ^ = 1  
Only one of these solutions (the one with "X = 1/3) also 
solves 7.2. 
An article by Komai and Liptak (29) suggest an 
alternative set of operational control instruments. Their 
results were designed for application to a socialist economy 
but they are equally applicable here. Their results suggest 
the use of a set of instruments which includes one price 
for each activity in the model, one quota for each constraint 
which affects no more than one department, and four quotas 
for each constraint which affects more than one department. 
If this set of instruments were chosen the college dean 
would select values for the elements of the vectors 
^ = 
He would then ask the ith department chairman to select 
n 
and u = 
^1 
^2 
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activity levels which would solve 7*5» 
( 7 , 5 )  m a x  
x^éXi (ui) 
X. (u. ) =' 
^ — 
f-i 
^i 
w Ih H = 
.-i 
' = oj. 
The dean should, if he follows Komai and Liptâk's procedure 
set^ = c. Then 7-5 would become 
(7.6) max c? x^ 
x^£Xi (u^) 
The set of control instruments can be considered 
effective only if there exists at least one vector u* such 
that if the vectors Xj_(u|") solve problems 7*6 then the 
vector x(u*) = 
will solve 7.2. The existence of such a vector can be shown 
by construction.! 
rxf 
Let X* = 
* 
Xn 
solve 7.2. Let u^ = A^x^ for i = 1, 2 . 
Suppose when u^ is set equal to u^ that x^ solves the ith 
version of 7. 6 .  Thus c/x, = max c'x = c'x* since x* 
i i i i i i i 
Xi€Xi(u^) 
* 
necessarily belongs to Xj^(u^). Let x = 
n 
^For a more comprehensive treatment see (29). 
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Then c'x = c; c'x = c'x* = c'x*. x necessarily belongs 
1=1 i i il 
to X and thus by assumption^ c'= c'x*. Therefore, x 
solves 7.2, 
Two sets of operational control instruments have been 
found effective. Presumably these two sets of instruments 
could be "mixed" in ways which would yield other effective 
sets of instruments, but this will not be attempted here. 
This section will discuss alternative ways of 
discovering the best values for the operational control 
instruments considered above. 
One way of obtaining optimum values for these 
instruments would be for the college dean to solve directly 
the appropriate version of the college model. That is, he 
would obtain all of the coefficients in version one or 
version two, and solve the model as an ordinary linear 
program. If he chooses the first set of operational control 
instruments the solution x^ or x^ would give the appropriate 
values for his operational control instruments. If he 
chooses the second set of operational control instruments 
he should solve the dual of version two. He can then set 
solves the dual of (7.2).) 
If he chooses the third set of operational control 
instruments, he should solve 7.2. The solution vector 
IT = v^ and yO = c (v* 
^The assumption was that x* solves 7.2 and therefore 
c'x* - c'Sc for all ? belonging to X. 
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can then be used to obtain u'' by letting 
Since this way of obtaining opti:'nura values for the 
control instruments involves collecting whatever information 
may be needed prior to attempting to solve the problem 
(7.1 or 7.2), it is not immediately obvious what, if any, 
instruments would be used to help collect the information. 
It Was assumed earlier that the department chairmen's 
information about the elements of the matrices Aj_, and 
vectors b^^ was more complete than that of the college dean. 
Presumably then, the college dean must obtain whatever 
information about A and b that he uses from the department 
chairmen. If their (and his) time has alternative uses, he 
may not want them to take the time needed to tell him (nor 
will he Want to take the time needed to listen to or read 
their reports and to so:', the relevant material from the 
irrelevant) "everything that they know about their depart­
ments". Instead he might ask them to reveal, initially, their 
b^ vectors (the quantitative restrictions found only by the 
individual departments) and enough columns of A to allow him 
to obtain a feasible solution (to 7.1 or 7.2).^ 
lie could use this information to compute a tentative 
I'The requirement that the department chairmen initially 
quarantee the dean a feasible solution could be dispensed with 
by using an appropriate "first stage" procedure. 
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solution. The elements of the corresponding dual solution 
vector could be used to guide the search for information 
which could improve the solution. The process of discovering 
optimum values for the college dean's control vector would 
thus become an iterative one. 
During any (the Nth say) phase of this process the 
college dean would use those columns of A which he knows to 
solve the dual of ?.?. 
portion (i.e. those columns) of A ( and the corresponding 
elements of c* and x) which are known at the beginning of the 
Nth phase. 
During the second part of the Nth phase the college 
dean would inform the department chairmen of the elements of 
c and v''%N^ (the solution of the dual of the Nth phase version 
of 7.7) and ask them to report the technical coefficients 
(the elements in the column of the A matrix) corresponding 
to any activity such that Cj - A^ v%N^ is greater than 
zero.ï* ^ 
lc<, and Az refer in this context to individual 
activities and not to groups of activities. 
^It is evident the dean would have to emphasize that 
the activity must (in the case of those activities for 
which Cj ^  0) produce or use one unit of some commodity. 
The unit would also need to be defined. 
(7.7) max c^N^' x^»!^ 
X^ n)6X<N> 
X<n) = '(x<[r(^>|A^N)x<{^= b, x<N>^ oj-. 
The following A, ^ nd c' and x) merely indicates that 
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If any columns are reported they are added to A^N^to form 
A^N + for the next phase. If none are found the process 
would be terminated. The solution to the final version of 
7.7 could be used to obtain an optimum set of values for the 
first or third set of operational control instruments. The 
solution to the dual of the final version of 7»7 could be 
used to obtain appropriate values for the second set of 
operational control instruments described. 
If the above process were adopted it is apparent that 
commodity prices are the instruments which are used to guide 
the information gathering process. 
If on the other hand the college dean knew at the 
beginning of each phase only some rows of the matrix (A b), 
the solution vector x^^I^ would guide the information 
gathering process. The college dean would ask the department 
chairmen to report rows of (A b) which correspond to 
constraints violated by the Nth phase solution 
A mixed process could also be used. If the mixed 
process were adopted, at the beginning of the Nth phase, some 
rows of (A b) and some columns of A would not be known to 
the college dean. He would obtain a primal and dual solution 
based on the information available to him. The department 
^If none were found an optimum solution can be computed 
from the Nth phase version of the problem (as knovm to the 
college dean). If some are found they could be used to 
generate the N + 1th phase version of the problem. 
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chairmen would then be asked to report any "profitable" 
activities (columns of A) that they know of and any 
restrictions (rows of (A b)) which the Nth phase solution 
violates.1 
If both the number of rows and the number of columns 
needed to describe the college are finite (i.e. if the 
dimensions of A are finite) any of these procedures would 
terminate after a finite number of phases. The terminal 
(primal and dual) solutions obtained for any one of them 
could (barring human error) be used to construct the solution 
to the original problem (7.1 or 7.2) and its dual. 
If any of the variants of the information gathering 
process discussed above were adopted, the college dean and 
his staff would do most of the decision making. The depart­
ment chairmen would serve mostly as technicians or experts 
who can supply the various coefficients needed to solve the 
problem. Almost any workable scheme would need to rely 
heavily upon the knowledge of department chairmen and faculty 
members, but some schemes could also allow them to partici­
pate a bit more in the decision making process. 
Kornal and Llptâk (29) have described a procedure which 
could be used to obtain the optimum values for the third 
Ias before, if no such columns or rows are found the 
process terminates. If some are found they are used to form 
the N + 1th version of the problem. 
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set of operational control Instruments (y^and u) discussed 
above. As would be expected the vectory^ is set equal to c. 
The vector of quotas assigned to the various departments, 
would if their procedure were adopted, be actively used in 
the attempt to find an optimum vector of quotas u*. 
At the outset the college dean would inform each 
department chairmen of the values taken by those elements of 
c which correspond to activities supervised by his depart­
ment. He would then select quotas u^, . . u^ for each of 
his departments. Each department chairmen would be asked to 
determine the marginal value to his department of each 
commodity subject to quota. The college dean uses the 
marginal value Information which he receives to derive a 
second of quotas. This process would continue until an 
optimum set of quotas is obtained. 
The iterative procedure discussed above is designed to 
solve 7.8. 
(7.8) max cp ( u ) 
M * 
^1 
Un 
n 
n u. = '5, Xi (u. ) 0 , 
1=1 
1 = 1 ,  2  .  .  n  
where(p (u) =JZ max c7 x. 
' 1=1 ^ ^ 
x^£Xj_ (Uj_) 
If the procedure described by Kornai and Llptak were 
adopted, the college dean would, during the Nth phase of the 
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process, solve 7.9« 
(7.9) max (W<N - 1> ) ' u 
ueu 
He would use the solution vector u^n) to compute u^N^ ,, 
by letting 
u = 
(N - 1) 
u, 
- .1^  + jr u^ N^ , and N ^ • N 
would inform the ith department chairman of the values of 
the elements of Uj_^N^ and ask him to solve 7.10. 
(7.10) min 
V 
v{ r 
L 
= min 
Vi = 
jGi ^ 1<N> + ll 
V. 
i^ {/i I ^ i i^ " ®i ' - oj . 
The department chairmen use the solution vectors 
Vi<N> = (i = 1, 2 . , n) to compute by letting 
^ b^. They would then report the vectors 
Vj_^K) and z^^N^ to the college dean. 
The college dean would use the information to form 
and then W^N^by letting.— 
W<N> = 
Jnj 
and W^n) = 0 if N = 0 
tM - 1) W<N - 1> + 1 If N>0. 
N N 
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The college dean now has the information needed to begin the 
next phase of this process. 
In order to help decide when to terminate the process 
the dean could calculate during each phase two estimates of 
^(u*^), "J and (p ^ provides an upper estimate 
of ^ (u^l (i.e. ^ (u*) ) and provides a lower 
estimate of <p (u^) (i.e. - (p (u^) ), If these two 
estimates coincide, the college dean would know that he has 
found an optimum set of quotas. The estimates and 
(p could be obtained by letting 
<^n) = - ])2) - 1> 
, 1=1 
and =[w(N)J |^ u<N^  + 
1=1 
where = (" ' 1) "1^ + 1 %<«> • 
"T (u*) = max IJ—^ min f(u^, 
fui" 
u = 
u. 
n 
eu 
n 
while 94^ ) = , v^ ) 
1=1 Vj_eVi 
n , _ 
and = max HZ "^(u^, v^^ - 1/ )| where 
ru.i 
u = c u 
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f(u^, v^) = fill I 
H 
Since necessarily belongs to U and (for i = 1, 2 . .n) 
necessarily belongs to V^, it is clear that = 
^(u""") - (p for all integer values of N greater than one 
and for all integer values of H greater than zero. Thus 
whenever = <p or ^  + 1^ = (p the process 
can be terminated, u^N^ = then yields an optimum 
- Un <N>_ 
system of quotas. By solving the dual of the Nth 
(if ) or N + 1th (if ) 
phase version of 7.9» szi appropriate set of values can be 
obtained for the vector TT (which is part of the second set 
of operational control instruments discussed). 
Although it has been shown that lim = 
lim ^ =<p(u'^), the smallest N for which the termination 
N->c© ^ ' 
test is satisfied may be very large. This is the major 
2 disadvantage of this procedure. 
The procedure has some advantages. The major advantage 
is that the college dean need not keep track of very much 
information. He need only remember the restrictions which 
^See (29, p. 154). 
^Alternative termination conditions have been suggested 
by Kornai and Liptak (29) which would tend to insure termina­
tion in a finite number of phases. They suggest termination 
whenever 5'<Cw^ - <P = o or^^ + ]^- (p f where S 
is some preselected positive number. 
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define the set U and the current values of N, , 
u<N> , , Cp<^') , and Z^^N) for i = 1, 2 . . n. 
All other information which he receives can be used to 
update these values and then be discarded. In some cases 7.9 
can be solved by "microprogramming". When this is the case 
the college dean could appoint a separate manager for each 
commodity subject to quota. These managers could then, 
acting independently, determine at each phases the appro­
priate quotas for their commodities. This sort of 
"microprogramming" would be feasible if the set U can be 
defined by a set of restrictions none of which involves more 
than one commodity. In many cases the requirement that 
Xi(Ui) 7^ 0 can not be translated into restrictions of that 
sort. 
It seems reasonable to assume that if the college dean 
were willing to keep track of more of the information that 
he received, he could use a procedure that required, at most, 
a finite number of phases to reach an optimum set of quotas. 
n ^ 
It is Icnown that, for uGU, CP(u) = min [vz J:1 ' |uJ where 
i=l j [bQ 
the v^j's are the extreme points of the sets . The solu­
tions obtained by each department chairman when he solves 
his version of 7.10 could just as well be restricted to 
extreme points. This suggests that during the Nth phase the 
college dean could solve 7.11 rather than 7»9. 
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(7.11) max JZ t, 
1=1 
subject to 
tj^  - ~  ^~ I5 2 . . î'i 
i. — ]_ ) • • # *10. 
1— u, = E 
1=1 ^ 
1 
( u 0 ^ j = 1, . « . «ïi 
t^, u^ unrestricted^ i =1, . . . n 
)are the extreme points (if any) 
This means 
^The dual of 7«11 can easily be derived fron the dual 
of 7.2. If this were done it would be apparent that the 
restrictions X^(u^) r 0" (1 = 1, . . n) have the form 
"• "^^ i Uj^  — 1^  ,1=1} 2 . « , 1=1, 2 . . n 
where the v^^^l^'s ( = ^ 
^ Zl<la 
of the sets V^(0) = £v^ | v^ - 0, I'v^ = jl. 
Vi g 0 J 
that the restrictions needed to guarantee Xj_(u^) 0 
(for 1=1, . . n) could be generated as the process went 
along. If this route were taken the problems 7.12 would be 
solved as usual during each phase unless an unbounded 
solution v;as obtained. If an unbounded solution was obtained 
(for department'T' and phase "Ij) the problem would be solved 
again after substituting Vjj_(0) for . The rest of the 
procedure is the same as that described except that (a) 
the 's and Vj_<^> ' s resulting from minimization on 
y^(0) are always reported to the college dean; and (b) 
the fact that they are based on homogeneous solutions is 
also reported so that the college dean will know how to use 
the information. 
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The ' 8 which along with the 's solve the Nth 
phase version of 7,11 provide the college dean with an 
estimate of the optimiim values of the departmental objective 
functions (solutions to 7.12) which would result if the 
quotas ui^N)were selected. 
The college dean would report the vectors Uj_^N^ and 
^i(for i = 1, 2 . . n) to the department chairmen and 
ask them to solve 7.12. 
(7.12) min vf 
Vi^Vi J • 
\  ^ ''i - °} 
They would calculate the vectors by letting = 
j^i^N)^ ~i then report the v^^N^ * s and *s to 
the college dean for those departments (those i*s) for which 
< t^^N^ (that is, for those departments for which 
the college dean overestimated the value of the departmental 
objective function). 
This procedure would continue until at the end of some 
phase no is less than If the phase for 
which this occurs is phase M, then an optimum set of quotas 
is given by u^M^ , An appropriate set of values for the 
elements of could be obtained by solving the dual of the 
^The termination could remain the same as before if 
is redefined to be equal to 
C t,<N> . 
1=1 
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Mth phase version of the dual of 7.11. 
The nunber of phases required will be finite since 
there are at most a finite number of extreme points for 
each of the sets . The maximum number of phases required 
is equal to m^ where is the number of extreme points of 
The last procedure for discovering appropriate values 
for the dean's control instruments to be discussed involves 
the use of prices rather than quotas to guide the informa­
tion gathering process. If the college dean were to adopt 
this procedure he would, during each phase, establish prices 
on those commodities important to more than one department 
and ask the department chairmen to report the quotas which 
they would request at those prices. He would use this set 
of quotas to generate a new set of prices which would be used 
to generate a new set of quotas, and so forth. This 
procedure must be regarded as being more passive than the 
ones described above since the college dean does not, under 
this procedure, actively set or manipulate the quotas. 
This last procedure is a straightforward application of 
the decomposition principle. During the first stage the 
college dean uses the information received from the department 
^m^^ equals the number of extreme points of plus the 
number of extreme points of V^(0) if the modification 
suggested in the preceding footnote is adopted. 
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chairman to determine a feasible set of quotas. If he 
is successful, he then proceeds to the second stage. In 
the second stage he attempts to find an optimum set of 
quotas. 
Before initiating the procedure, the dean insures 
that each department is aware of the relevant components of 
c. During the Nth phase of the'first stage the college dean 
first solves the dual of the Nth version of 7-13. 
components to the department chairmen and asks them to solve 
problems 7.14. 
(7.13) max - 1* r 1 
V r = 0, = 0, 
, ri<^  1 ' ^ • 
After obtaining vector v^^ = he reports its 
Ipor N = 1 R reduces to 
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After obtaining the solution to his version of 7'!^ 
each department chairman would check to see if 
is greater than zero. If not he merely reports the fact 
that it is not to the college dean. If it is greater than 
zero he computes the vector of quotas which is consistent 
with his solution, x^^n)> to 7.1^ by setting u^^N^ = 
., lie also computes by setting = 
c? . He then reports and to the college 
dean. The college dean uses these elements to set up the 
(N + l)th phase version of 7•13* 
Let Nn be the smallest integer for which max C- I'rJ 
réR<Mi> 
is equal to zero. (This implies that a feasible set of 
quotas has been found.) The (N^ - l)th phase will then 
have been the last full phase of stage 1. The N]_th phase 
consists of solving the N^th phase version of 7.13» 
discarding the r vector (or fixing its elements equal to 
zero), and completing the N^th phase of the second stage. 
During the Nth phase of the second stage the college 
dean would solve the dual of 7.15. 
(7.15) n N-1 
max i; [\o>] 
1=1 j=l 
subject to 
n—1 
lH =1, i =1,2 . . n 
j=l > 
%i<j> =0 , j = 1,2 . . N - 1 
i = 1,2 . . . . n 
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He reports the elements of the solution vector v^:]} to the 
department chairmen, and asks them to solve problems 7.16. 
(7.16) =  m a x ^ ( o '  -  £ v < M > -  q  
The ith department chairman then reports the values of 
^i^X) to the college dean if is greater 
than zero. and can be obtained by letting 
= c^ and 
where x^^m) is any extreme 
point solution to his version of 7.I6. 
The second stage terminates at the end of the first 
phase, say the Ngth, for vjhich = 0 for i = 1,2 . . n. 
N2 will be finite since each of the sets (and X^(0) ) 
has only a finite number of extreme points. 
An optimum set of prices for those commodities 
affecting more than one department can be obtained directly 
from the solution to the dual of the N2th phase version of 
7.15. An ^ Dt^mum set of quc^^aSjCan be obtained by setting 
\  l i f e  ^ > ]  
lln the event that an unbounded solution was obtained 
to 7.1^ or 7.16 the procedure outlined in Chapter 4 could 
be used. The college dean would then be warned that the 
solution to the original (7.1^ or 7.16) problem was 
unbounded (for some department) and that (for that depart­
ment) the solution reported was obtained by solving the 
modified version of 7.14 or 7.16. 
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where the ' s s - n d s  solve the N2th phase version 
of 7.15. 
Several sets of operational control Instruments and 
several procedures for obtaining appropriate values for 
these instruments have been discussed. 3ach of the procedures 
for obtaining values for these instruments could be used to 
obtain appropriate values for the instruments of more than 
one of the sets of operational control instruments. Table 
2 outlines some of the possible combinations of operational 
control instruments and procedures for obtaining appropriate 
values for them. The three cells labeled ''not considered" 
represent schemes which would be feasible if the information 
gathering procedures discussed were modified somewhat. They 
will not be considered here because they require a largely 
unnecessary flow of information. Two of them require first 
that the department chairmen compute the optimum activity 
levels, second that they send this information to the college 
dean, and third that the college dean ask each department 
chairman to implement exactly those activity levels which 
the department chairman has just computed. 
Instead of solving 7.1 or 7.2 directly it should be 
possible to obtain a solution to 7.2 (and thus to 7.1) in a 
way which would allow simulation of one of the schemes in 
Table 2. 
Schemes I, II, and III are inappropriate for this 
purpose.primarily because the simulatable portions of these 
Table 2. Alternative decision making schemes. 
Alternative methods for obtaining optimum 
values of operational control instruments 
Centralized _ . _. , ., , 
methods Decentralized methods 
Types of 
operational 
control 
Major 
instruments 
Major used 
Ihstrments 
used 
Activity levels, Quotas Quotas Prices 
prices, or both (only new (aHrelevant 
information information 
used) used) 
Centralized 
Decentralized 
Activity levels 
Prices 
Quotas 
not not not 
Scheme I considered considered ccn^dered 
Scheme II Scheme IV.a Scheme iV.b Scheme VI 
Scheme III Scheme V.a Scheme V.bSsheme VII 
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schemes are too direct. The major difference between these 
schemes and direct solution is that between each iteration 
new columns or rows (activities or constraints) are added 
to the model. The difficult part of this is not adding 
the column or row but conducting the research on which to 
base the new column or row. 
Schemes II, IV.a, IV.b, and VI involve the use of a 
set of operational control instruments which may not be 
effective. Therefore, they will not be adopted. Instead 
the control instruments which they would use will be tested 
for the particular model which has been formulated after a 
solution has been arrived at by another method. 
Schemes IV.a and V.a will not be used primarily because 
of the possibility of having to choose either an approximate 
solution or a long (large number of phases) solution 
procedure. 
This leaves schemes V.b and VII. Either of these 
schemes could be used to obtain a solution to version two 
of the college model. However, scheme VII seems to 
correspond more closely to the actual decision making 
processes of many academic institutions. That is, as part 
of the decision making process department chairmen are often 
asked to compute and submit budget "requirements" on the 
basis of "guidelines" which the college dean had previously 
issued. If the requirements exceed the total amount of 
funds which the college dean has available, the college dean 
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may ask that alternative sets of "requirements" be 
prepared which require less funds (i.e. which place a 
higher opportunity cost on budget resources). Somehow at 
the end of this process "firm" budgets are obtained. The 
department chairmen then operate their departments as best 
they can with the resources which they have been allocated. 
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VIII. TliS COLLEGE MODEL : SOLUTION AND EXTENSIONS 
When applied to the college model, 7.8 can be written 
max Ynax c' x + max x-. + max ct x, 4- max c" x ^  I  a  a  b o  a  a  e e v  
x^€X^(u^) Xg€Xg(uQ)j 
subject to 
Ua + Ub + ua + Ug = D 
Xj_(u^) 0 for i = a, b, d, and e. 
The first set of constraints can be rewritten (taking 
advantage of the fact that the best values of some elements 
are knovrn to be zero) as 
(8.1) 
^al + ^ el -725 
(8.2) CM 
^e2 -400 
(8.3) 
^a3 + ^b3 
£ 
-160 
(8.4) 4-
-0.75 
(8.5) Ub5 + -1.25 
(8.6) a^6 T- ^bo {k -2.75 
(8.7) 
^a7 T Ub7 + ^ d7 
u-
^e7 à 0 
(8.8) a^8 + + ^e8 27 
(8.9) a^9 .+ %9 ^e9 19,125 
(8.10) UalO + UblO + *dlO + Uelu ^ 1 ,095,000. 
The first three constraints (8.1, 8.2, and 8.3) deal 
with instruction produced by some departments of the college 
for graduate students in other departments. The first type 
of instruction (constraint 8.1) considered is instruction 
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supplied by department A for Economics graduate students 
and for graduate students of other colleges. The second 
type of instruction (constraint 8.2) is supplied by 
department 3 to Economics graduate students and graduate 
students of other colleges. The third type of instruction 
(constraint 8.3) is supplied by department 3 to graduate 
students of department A and to graduate students of other 
colleges. 
The next three constraints deal vrith teaching services 
supplied by departments of the college for use by other 
departments. In this model these transfers account for the 
fact that the supervisory committees which guide the study 
of graduate students often include one or more members from 
the departments in xThich the student takes supporting 
courses. The pattern of production and use for the three 
types of teaching services considered is the same as for the 
three types of instruction considered above. 
The next constraint (constraint 8.7) insures that the 
rate of small classroom use does not exceed the rate of 
classroom allocation provided by "department" D. Constraint 
8.8 insures that the rate of large classroom use does not 
exceed the allocation granted by the university president. 
(27 units per year). 
Constraint 8.9 insures that the amount of office 
space used by the college does not exceed that allocated to 
the college by the university president. Constraint 8.10 
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insures that the rate of use of teaching budget funds does 
not exceed the rate authorized by the university president. 
An optimal u vector was computed using the passive 
(based on the decomposition lemma) procedure discussed in 
Chapter ?• In most cases the college dean would not actually 
need to use the first stage of that procedure because he 
would be able to select a feasible set of quotas at the 
outset. However, for this example the computations were 
were carried out almost exactly as suggested in Chapter ?. 
Department models A, 3, and D had (for some prices) 
unbounded solutions. These were treated essentially as 
suggested in Chapter The model of department A also 
had (for some prices) solutions that were nearly unbounded. 
In order to keep these solutions manageable the set X 
—a 
was bounded by requiring that u^^ ^  ^al ^  ~ ^^00. The 
particular bound chosen was a good deal smaller (larger in 
absolute value) than it needed to be. Most of the components 
of u could have been bounded on the basis of the sort of 
a priori information which the various decision makers would 
ordinarily possess. In some cases, however, adding these 
bound would have resulted in no gain and may have increased 
the number of phases required to obtain a solution. 
The prices which the college dean would have transmitted 
^Thc only difference was that the restriction I'x^ = 
1.02 was used in some cases instead of the restriction 
I'x^ = 1. 
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to the departnents during eaoh phase of the solution 
procedure are shovra. in Table 40. The quotas ïmich the 
department chairmen would have requested at these prices 
are shown in Tables 41, 42, 43, and 44. 
The sixth phase was the first phase of stage two. The 
total number of phases required was 22. 
An optimum set of quotas is shovm in Table 45. The 
solutions to the departmental models are, for this set of 
quotas, shovm in Tables l4, 27, 50, and 64. The dual 
solutions are presented in Tables 15, 28, 51, and 65. 
The final (phase 22) version of 7.15 can be used to 
examine the effectiveness of several alternative sets of 
control instruments. 
The ineffectiveness of prices alone as instruments to 
control the production and use of those commodities affecting 
more than one department is apparent. The "best" prices 
would be part of the vector which solves the dual of the 
final version of 7.15. The optimal basis for the final 
version of 7.15 includes two vectors which were based on 
homogeneous solutions. It also includes 4 vectors based on 
extreme points of , 3 vectors based on extreme points of 
X^» and 3 vectors based on extreme points of X^. If prices 
were used as control instruments any basic vector which was 
based on an extreme point would be, for some department, an 
optimal vector of commodity use rates. As a result, it is 
unlikely that the use rates that the departments would pick 
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(if guided only by prices) would result in a solution to the 
college model which would be both feasible axid optimal. 
The particular' structure of the model considered here 
suggests that a "mixed'"' set of control instruments might be 
more effective. If this set of control instruments were 
adopted, those departments which provide instruction (and 
teaching services) used by other departments in the college 
would be required to meet or exceed certain output quotas. 
Quotas would also be used to control the use of classrooms, 
office space and teaching budget funds. Prices would be used 
to control the use of instruction (and teaching services) 
produced by other departments in the college. 
It is apparent that this set of instruments would 
effectively control resource use (and production) by depart­
ments 3 and D since these departments do not use any inputs 
produced by other departments within the college. 
This set of control instruments can not be judged 
ineffective merely by examining the final (phase 22) version 
of 7.15» For each department the number of basic activities 
is less than the number of constraints that would be imposed 
by the set of control instruments being considered. Thus the 
set of control instruments might be effective. 
The effectiveness of this set of control instruments 
was tested by first solving the two linear programs (for 
departments A and S) implied by the set of instruments and 
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then testing the sensitivity of the solutions to changes in 
the prices assigned to instruction and teaching services 
furnished by other departments. In both cases the set of 
control instruments was found effective. 
Is is customary for co l lege  deans to be actively 
involved in the allocation of funds and space but ordinarily 
they do not become as involved in the allocation of 
instruction and teaching services. The set of instruments 
considered above is of interest primarily because it suggests 
that the college dean ne-id not be actively involved in the 
allocation of instruction and teaching services. 
The success of the test made above should not be 
interpreted as a confirmation of this hypothesis. It merely 
indicates that for the model used here there exist 
equilibrium prices for, and quantities of, instruction and 
teaching services. It does not show that this equilibrium 
is in any sense a stable equilibrium. That is, it does not 
demonstrate that the equilibrium quantities and prices could 
be determined without the college dean (or some other person) 
being actively involved in the process.^ 
lof course deans don't usually get involved in this. 
More commonly departments predict the ''demand" for the service 
instruction and service resources which they provide and plan 
on the basis of this prediction. Viewed within the frame­
work of the model considered here it is apparent that such an 
approach would ordinarily give an infeaslble or suboptimal 
solution. However, in a model which allowed for product 
improvement or worsening (and thus for more flexible class 
sizes and so forth) this treatment of service instruction 
and service resources would undoubtedly fare much better. 
In either event this method of handling this matter prob­
ably reduce the number of phases required to obtain an. 
optimum set of quotas for the other commodities. 
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The treatment of the allocation of classroom use in 
the model was quite arbitrary. At least two alternatives 
could be suggested. One would involve requiring that the 
rate of classroom use not exceed some fixed level. Unless 
this rate is fairly large relative to the number of class­
rooms available (that is, unless it permits a high use rate 
per classroom) this alternative would seem to be even more 
arbitrary and unrealistic than the approach actually taken. 
Another alternative would be to treat the services 
of classrooms as free goods. This alternative was imple­
mented by eliminating the constraints on classroom use. 
The total college budget was decreased by the amount 
formerly allocated to the classroom allocation "department" 
in order to isolate the "price effect" of this change from 
the "budget effect". 
As would be expected, the value of the college dean's 
objective function increased. An exact solution was 
computed, and it was determined that the increase in the 
value of the college dean's objective function would be 
relatively small. Table 4? presents an optimal solution to 
the dual of 7•15. Table 48 presents an optimal set of 
quotas. 
The models presented in this study have treated the 
rate of undergraduate degree production as being a variable 
which the various decision makers could not, or were 
reluctant to, actively control. While it was felt that this 
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is not exactly the case in many educational institutions 
the loss in reality was probably -nore than offset by the 
gain in ease of formulation afforded by this treatment. 
Treating the rate of undergraduate degree production as 
a controllable variable would effectively increase the 
number of commodities whose use and production rates must be 
coordinated by the college dean (or by some other decision 
maker). Graduate students in any given discipline may take 
the bulk of their courses in 2 to 4 departments but it is 
not uncommon for undergraduate students majoring in any 
given discipline to take courses in as many as fifteen 
different departments. 
The college model presented in Chapter ?•involved a 
college having three academic departments. Most colleges 
have more departments. For such a college the number of 
commodities requiring coordination by the college dean (or 
by some other decision maker) would be greater than for a 
college having only three departments. 
The decision making schemes discussed in Chapter ? may 
be extended to multi-level decision making schemes. In fact 
it is possible to regard the schemes discussed there as 
being the final parts of longer multi-level decision making 
schemes. 
In the case of the college considered earlier it is 
reasonable to assume that some of the commodities relevant to 
a model of that colloge may al;:;o be relevant to at leant 
one other college v.-ithin the university. The university 
president could thus be involved in the allocation of these 
commodities anons the various colleges in the university. 
If the X'lords "university president" were substituted 
for the Words "college dean" and the ^ords "college deans" 
were substituted for the words "department chairmen" the 
schenes discussed in Chapter ? could be used to arrive at 
an allocation of these comiiodities between the colleges. 
After the university president has made these allocations, 
the decision making process could continue in each college 
as originally described in Chapter ?. 
In the college model presented earlier the college 
dean's objective function involved more than twenty flexible 
targets. If the decision making schemes discussed were to 
be extended to the management of all of the state controlled 
educational institutions in a state or to the management of 
all state controlled institutions it is apparent that these 
schemes could require that some decision maker's objective 
function involve a very large number of flexible targets. 
It seems unreasonable to believe that such a decision maker 
would feel qualified to assign weights to each of these 
targets. Fortunately the requirement that he be able to do 
this may be relaxed a bit. 
It may be that such a decision maker might adopt a view 
of the outputs of educational institutions which permits him 
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to consider a smaller number of outputs. There are many 
different ways in which he could view the outputs of the 
state's educational institutions. For example, he might 
not be concerned with the numbers of degrees of various 
types awarded or with the number of pages published by 
faculty members except as these outputs have their impacts 
on the state's supply of trained manpower, on the economic 
development of the state, or on some other measure of the 
state's performance or potential. 
If this decision maker can communicate the weights 
which he would assign to each of these more final outputs 
clearly enough, it may be possible for each college dean or 
department chairman to translate them into weights for the 
outputs of a college or department. 
The decision making schemes considered in Chapter 7 
dealt only with linear objective functions. In general, 
these schemes cannot cope with non-linear objective functions. 
However, some sorts of non-linear objective functions can be 
handled without too much difficulty. One class of such 
functions includes functions having the form of the so-called 
"utility tree".^ An objective function having this form 
can be written as 
0 = p|^f]_(x3_), f2(%2)' • • • ^n^^n^ • 
Istrotz (39) discusses some of the implications of this 
type of utility function. 
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If P is a concave in both the f^'s and the x^'s and if each 
fj is concave in the activity levels Xj then some of the 
schemes discussed in Chapter 7 could, with some modification, 
be applied. 
If the assumptions made above hold, the set of control 
instruments which involves the use of quotas to control the 
use and production of commodities affecting more than one 
department would still be an effective set of instruments. 
That is, if the ith department chairman maximized f^Cx^) on 
the set X^(u^) there would exist vectors u^ such that 
(for i = 1, 2 . • • ,n) would maximize p on the set X. 
Much the same sort of construction proof that was used 
earlier for the linear case could be used to demonstrate the 
validity of this assertion. 
The passive approach to the determination of an optimal 
set of quotas as discussed for the linear case could, in 
principle, be modified to give an optimal set of quotas for 
this particular non-linear case. Stage one of this approach 
would proceed exactly as described in Chapter ?• During the 
Nth phase of the second stage of this procedure the college 
dean would solve the dual of 8.11 rather than the dual of 
7.15. 
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(8.11) max F(Zi, . . . Z^) 
subject to-Zj_ = ÇZ fi(%i<j>) , 
1 = 1, 2 . n 
N-l 
n ET r%iO>j=1,1 = 1,2.. 
j=l 
'X|5_0^ 2, . N - 1 
i.~l) 2 « « « «11 
(If P is non-linear the college dean may have to solve 
8.11 before its dual can be solved.) The college dean 
would report the elements of the dual solution vector 
\<N>] 
<N>= 
v<N> 
gn<N> 
to the department chairmen. The ith department chairmen 
would solve (during the Nth phase) problem 
(8.12) A  C V A  .  .  n  r  
maz^ J fi(Xi) - [.v<N> J x.j" 
Xi€X^ 
If-/lj_Ol> is greater than qj_<N> he computes fj_(r^<:-i^) 
and (as before) u^<N>, and reports them to the college 
dean. The college dean uses these elements to form the 
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À' -r Ith phase version of 3.11. 
There are at least two ways in which adopting a non­
linear objective function of the type described above could 
lead to complications. First, if the functions ? and f,. . 
f^ are nonlinear (concave) the college dean and department 
chairr.ien r.iay encounter somewhat more difficulty when attempt­
ing to solve 3.11 and 8.12. Secondly, if the fh's are 
nonlinear (concave) the solutions to problems 3.12 will not 
always be extreme points of the sets X.. Although the 
procedure would still converge monotonically to a raaxi^nun of 
? on the set X, the number of phases required to obtain an 
exact solution to the problem as formulated night not be 
finite. This drawback is probably not too severe, however, 
since an exact solution may not always be required. 
If the fi*8 are linear the solutions to the problems 
8.12 can be limited to the extreme points of (or of Xi (0)) 
and solution in a finite number of phases would be assured. 
It has been assumed that preference functions of the 
department chairmen were consistent with that of the college 
dean. Each target which was fixed from the point of view 
of the college dean was, if it affected only one department, 
assumed to be regarded as a fixed target by one of the 
department chairmen. The flexible targets were given the same 
relative weights by both the college dean and the department 
chairmen. 
If the preference functions of the department chairmen 
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are not consistent with that of the college dean much of the 
discussion of Chapter 7 is no longer relevant. Although 
they may not regard them as targets but merely as restrictions, 
the department chairmen would undoubtedly still insure that 
the fixed targets and quotas set by the college dean are 
met. However, the college dean might have a difficult time 
maximizing his objective function if he attempts to use a 
decentralized decision making scheme. 
In order to try to achieve a maximum value of his 
objective function the college dean may impose restrictions 
in addition to those needed to guarantee that fixed targets 
are met. He may impose additional restrictions on activity 
levels, on output levels, on input levels, or on input-output 
combinations, 
If the college dean does not impose these additional 
restrictions but chooses instead to do the best that he can 
using only quotas, he may have a more difficult time finding 
a best set of quotas. If the department chairmen's objective 
functions were consistent with his ox-m, the college dean 
could be assured that the vector x|"(uj_) chosen by the ith 
department chairman would be such that c^ xf(u^) would not 
decrease if some elements of u^^ were increased without 
lowering any of the other elements. He could also be assured 
that c^ x.^'(Uj_) is concave in u^. However if the ith 
department chairman is seeking to maximize df (d^ ^ o^) 
V % 
Cj_ x^(Uj_) need not be a concave nondecreasing function of u^. 
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The college dean could allocate nore resources to department 
i and get less in return (as measured by c? x^(u^) ). 
In this sort of situation the college dean would often, 
when deciding whether or not to allocate additional resources 
to any department, need to ask the department chairman what 
he would do with these additional resources. Even if the 
department chairmen are not using the same set of prices for 
their planning, dissemination of the college dean's prices 
nay still be helpful since the department chairmen would then 
know what the costs (in terms of the changes in their output 
plans that would be required to obtain more resources) of 
additional resources are. By announcing his prices the college 
dean may tend to cause the department chairmen to act as if 
they were maximizing objective functions consistent with that 
of the college dean,^ 
^This convergence of objective function weights need 
not be one-sided. If the college dean's prices (or weights) 
are announced, the department chairmen may convince him that 
his weights are wrong. That is, they may be able to convince 
him that his evaluations of some of the outputs are incorrect. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Several models have been presented and on the basis of 
these models several decision naking schemes have been 
discussed. Both the models and the decision making schemes 
would have to be modified if they were to fit any particular 
institution. Some of the deficiencies may be quite general. 
That is, there may be features common to nearly all educational 
institutions which have not been treated adequately. For any 
particular institution it is certain that there are features 
which have been treated inadequately. 
Some potential deficiencies in the models have been 
pointed out in Chapters 6 and ?. These will not be repeated 
here. 
The deficiencies and potential limitations of the decision 
making schemes have not been discussed quite as completely. 
At least two of these limitations are particularly obvious. 
The first is that the schemes discussed placed all of the 
decision making responsibility on the college dean and depart­
ment chairmen, whereas many other persons are also involved 
in the decision making process. 
A second limitation is the large number of phases 
apparently required to reach a final decision. This is more 
serious than the treatment here would indicate. For the 
purposes of the results obtained in Chapter 8, it was assumed 
that the model had been completely specified at the 
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beginning of the decision process» In practice, however, 
the department chairmen would tend to formulate their model 
less completely initially and then improve upon them as 
necessary. Thus a good deal more work may be required duri 
each phase than is apparent from Chapters ? and 8. 
The large number of phases required to reach a final 
decision is due in part to the particular formulation 
chosen. If the model or the decision making scheme were 
modified so that the college dean were actively involved in 
the allocation of fewer resources then the number of phases 
required would tend to decrease. 
The department chairmen may ordinarily be able to supp! 
the college dean with a feasible set of quota requests at 
the beginning of the decision process. If this were done 
the phases that would otherwise be needed to obtain a 
feasible solution could be eliminated. In practice several 
other phases would probably be eliminated since the college 
dean would not be expected to continue the process for as 
many phases as would be required to obtain an exact solu­
tion. As can be seen from Table 46 the improvements in the 
value of the objective function were all ra.ther small after 
about the 13th or l4th phase. 
The thesis has dealt with models which can be solved 
for optimum output and activity levels and with decision 
making schemes which promise to yield optimum solutions to 
these models. However, the major advantage to be derived 
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from the use of models may turn out to be the organized vrays 
they provide for looking at particular problems rather than 
the numerical solutions that can be obtained. 
The use of a model forces the decision maker to set 
forth the major variables and the most inportant relation­
ships which are involved in a particular problem. Having 
set forth the elements of the situation as he sees it, he 
may be in a better position to determine what additional 
information is needed and what existing information may be 
ignored or at least set aside for a while. Once he has 
outlined the general framework of the problem he may be able 
to decentralize the task of filling in the exact details 
for each of its sectors or subsectors. 
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XII. APPENDIX A 
Table 3, Final products, department A. 
Commodity 
number 
a 
*00 
*5 
Product description 
Ph.D. degrees awarded by department A 
Masters degrees awarded by depart­
ment A 
Training of undergraduate students 
majoring in discipline A. 
Instruction in the principles of 
discipline A. 
Advanced undergraduate (and minor 
graduate) instruction in discipline 
A. 
Graduate level instruction in the 
methods of discipline A. 
Graduate instruction in the theory 
of discipline A» 
Unit of measurement 
One degree per academic 
(9-10 month) year. 
One degree per academic 
(9-10 month) year. 
One undergraduate unit per 
year. One unit is amount of 
instruction (and departmental 
administration) in discipline 
A which is required to pro­
duce ono Bachelor's degree 
(in discipline A) per year. 
One instructional unit per 
year. An instructional unit 
is one (3 quarter hours) 
course taught to one student. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above, 
^ Commodities a^ and slqq are commodities for which no constraints have been 
included in the model. 
Table 3. (continued) 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
Faculty teaching services (advanced 
\mdergraduate or minor graduate 
teaching). 
One unit of teaching per year. 
A unit of teaching is the 
amount required to teach 
(including preparation) one 
(3 quarter hours) course. 
^7 Faculty teaching services (graduate level "methods" teaching)• Same as above. 
Publications by "theory" faculty 
members. 
One publication (20 pages of 
publications) per year. 
*9 Publications by "methods" faculty members• Same as above. 
®10 Publications by "applications" 
_ .... faculty members. Same as above. 
) 
Table 4. Intermediate products, department A. 
^nmber^^ Product description 
Faculty teaching services (graduate 
level "theory" teaching). 
a^2 Faculty teaching services (under­
graduate principle teaching). 
a,. Teaching services provided by 
'13 graduate teaching assistants, 
a^z^ Teaching services provided by 
graduate student instructors, 
a, t Secretarial and clerical 
^ assistance used by teaching 
activities. 
Research assistance ("theory" 
research) provided by Masters 
degree candidates. 
a^y Research assistance ("methods" 
research) provided by Masters 
degree candidates. 
Unit of measurement 
One unit of teaching per year, 
A unit of teaching is the amount 
required to teach (including 
preparation) one (3 quarter 
hours) course. 
Same as above. 
One unit of teaching assistance 
per year. One unit is the 
amount of assistance required to 
"teach" one recitation section 
or one hour of laboratory per 
week for one quarter. 
Same as for faculty instruc­
tional services. 
One woman year (9-10 months) 
per year. 
One half (4.5 months full time 
equivalent) man year per year. 
Same as above 
Table 4. (continued). 
^nZbei^^ Product description 
a^g Research assistance ("applications" 
research) provided by Masters degree 
candidates, 
a^o Research assistance ("theory" research 
provided by Ph.D. candidates. 
b,2q Research assistance ("methods" research 
provided by Ph.D. candidates. 
^21 Research assistance ("applications" 
research) provided by Ph.D. candidates. 
b.22 Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "theory" research activities, 
a23 Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "methods" research activities, 
e.2k • Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "applications" research 
activities, 
aot Research services provided by "theory" 
faculty members, 
®-2é Research services provided by "methods" 
faculty members. 
a2y Research services provided by 
"applications" faculty members. 
Unit of measurement 
One half (4,5 months full time 
equivalent) man year per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as abo -, 
Same as above. 
One woman year (9-10 months) 
per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
One man year (9-10 months) 
per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Table 4, (continued). 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
^28 Counselling and advising of 
undergraduate students. 
One counselling unit per year» 
One unit is the amount of advis­
ing required per student 
(discipline A major) per quarter. 
&29 Counselling and advising of 
graduate students. Same as above. 
*30 Thesis (and related) supervision 
of graduate students. 
The supervision of 3 thesis 
credit hours per year. 
Table 5* Primary products, department A. 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
»31 
®32 
«33 
a35 
^36 
®37 
^38 
*39 
*40 
Instruction provided for department A*s Same as for 82* 
graduate students by departments outside 
of A*s college. 
Teaching services provided to depart­
ment A by departments outside of A*s 
college. 
Instruction provided for department A*s 
graduate students by department B. 
Teaching services provided to depart­
ment A by department B*s faculty 
members. 
Large classroom use. 
Small classroom use. 
Office space use. 
Teaching budget funds. 
"Theory" research funds, 
"Methods" research funds. 
Same as for a^, 
Same as for ag. 
Same as for a^. 
One classroom unit per year. 
One unit is the amount (no, 
of hours) of classroom use 
required to conduct a class 
meeting one hour per week for 
one quarter. 
Same as above. 
One square foot. 
One dollar per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Table 5. (continued). ' ' - - . 
Product description Unit of measurement 
aifi "Applications" research funds. One dollar per year. 
8^2 Master's candidates. One new candidate per year. 
a43 Ph.D. candidates. Same as above, 
a^i}. "Theory" faculty members. One faculty member, 
aij,^ "Methods" faculty members. Same as above. 
a45 "Applications" faculty members. Same as above. 
Table 6. Researchactivities. 
Theory research Methods research Applications research 
Activity activities activities activities 
lumbers a? &8 ag aio ail ^12 ai 3 ai4 ai5 ai6 
Commodity — 
numbers 
ag -2.0 -1.75 -1.75 -1.5 
&Q —3*0 —3*0 —2*25 —1*75 —1*5 
a^Q —3*0 —2*25 "•3*0 -2.0 —1*5 
a]Lé 1.0 2*0 
&iy 3*0 4.0 
a^g 2.0 3.0 
a-^^ 2.0 1*5 
B.20 4.0 7eO H 
agx 3»0 4*0 ^ 
^22 *2 .2 .2 .2 
a23 1.0 .75 .75 .75 .5 
^24 .5 .25 .5 *5 *125 
ag^ 11 1 1 
^26 11111 
a27 11 11 1 
a^g 500 700 700 1200 
az^Q 2400 2800 3000 5000 2000 
aij,]_ 2400 2250 4000 4000 500 
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Table ?• "Degree" activities. 
Activity 
number 18 ^19 20 
Commodity 
number 
ai -1 
5 1 
aif, 6 7 
^28 
®29 
^33 
^42 
^43 
4 6 
6 10 
a^O ^ ® 
a^i 1 3 
2 4 
Table 8. Advising, teaching, and thesis supervision. 
Teaching Teaching Teaching Thesis 
Advising Undergraduate activities activities (theory) supervision 
activities teaching (applications) (methods) 
^21 ^2 ^23 ^24 *25 *26 *27 *28 ®29 *30 ^31 *32 ®33 
*2 -40.0 -40.0 -40.0 
~35*0 —35*0 —35*0 
a^^ —25*0 —25*0 
*5 
H I'O 
ay 1.0 
*11 
^12 
*13 
ai4 
a^^ 0.1 0.1 
®^28 *"^0*0 
a2^ —100.0 
®30 
*32 
*34 
a^^ .5 *5 
3*0 5.0 3*0 3*0 3*0 3*0 3*0 3*0 3*0 3*0 
—20.0 —20.0 
.85 .95 1*05 *15 .2 
.90 1.05 .20 
.85 1*05 
.4 
*3 
*15 .15 .20 
2.5 3.0 2.5 
.5 .45 .45 .2 .1 
.02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 *02 
-6.5 
*05 
*10 
Table 9» Graduate student appointments 
Masters* candidate 
Activity appointments 
numbers a^  ^
Commodity 
numbers 
-18,0 
®16 "I'O 
a^  ^y —»1 • 0 
a^  g «-1 • 0 
ai9 
®20 
®21 
^37 40 40 40 40 
a^ g 2800 
a^  ^ 2700 
a^ Q 2700 
a^ l 2700 
&j^2 - *5 -*5 -«5 -*5 
Ph.D. candidate 
appointments 
a-^ io a4o *42 
-3.0 
-6.0 1 
1; 
CO 
—1.0 
—1.0 
47 47 60 
3350 
3000 
3000 
-1/3 -1/3 -1/4 
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Table 10. Secretarial activities. 
Activity numbers a^  ^ a44 a^  ^ a^  ^
Commodity 
numbers 
ai5 -1 
2^2 
323 
&2h -1 
a^ y 140 140 140 140 
a^ g 3400 
a^ ç 3^ 00 
3400 
ai^ l 3400 
Table 11, Faculty allocation activities. 
Activity Theory faculty Methods faculty Applications faculty 
numbers a<2 5^3 5^6 5^0 
Commodity 
numbers 
a^ —3*0 —7,0 —^«0 
ay —3*0 —7*0 "«^ ,0 —^ *0 
—7*0 —^ ,0 —4*0 
a^ 2 —3*0 —3*0 —3*0 
a^  ^ —0*34 —0*3^  —0*3^  -1,0 
a^  ^ —0*3^  —0*3^  —0*3^  —leO 
agip —0*3^  ^ 0*3^  —1*0 
125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Û38 8580 8580 8580 9900 9900 9900 9240 9240 
a^  ^ 4420 4420 4420 13000 
aj^Q 5100 5100 5100 15000 
a^ i 4760 4760 14000 
aji|_^  1*0 1*0 1*0 1*0 
a/j,^  1*0 1*0 1*0 1*0 
a^ i^ g 1*0 1*0 1,0 
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Table 12. Constraints, department A model. 
Commodity constraint®- Reason for constraint 
yal = - 30,0 Fixed target 
M M 
M It 
M 
II 
ya2 = - 1400.0 
ya3 = - 860.85 
ya4 = - 85*0 
ya5 = - 100,0 
ya6 = - 2,89 
ya? A . 2.0 " " 
 ^0, i = 8,9,10 Accounting constraints 
a^i = 0, i = 11, . . . 30. Intermediate product 
(accounting) constraints 
Aq^ x^  - y^ j^  = 0 i = 31,32 Accounting constraints 
7^ 33 = 40.63 Resource allocation granted 
to department A by the 
college dean 
ya34 = 1.25 Same as above 
II M ti 
M 
ya35 - 0.6 
Fa36 = 327.56 
ya37 = 3226.20 « " " 
ya38 = 133,750.62 « " " 
ya39 = 21,000 Resource constraint imposed 
by non-university sources of 
research funds 
yaZj-o = 70,000 Same as above 
yaifi = 40,000 " " " 
7^al = Aai^ a for i = 1, 2 ... 46 where Aai is the ith 
row of Aa. 
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Table 12, (continued). 
Commodity constraint Reason for constraint 
^ - ya42 S 2.0 Constraints due to students' 
decisions about graduate 
school attendance 
0 = ya43 4.0 Same as above 
3^ a44 ~ 0 Numbers of faculty positions 
authorized by the university 
president 
7ak5 = 5 Same as above 
ya46 = 5. 0 Same as above 
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Table 13. Objective function weights associated with 
flexible targets, department A. 
Symbols used for flexible* . Objective function 
target levels _ weights 
yao(= - =a20)^  
yaOO(- " Xal?)^  
.ya8(= - Zal) 
y a 9 ~  X a z )  
yalo(= - Za?) 
ya3l(= Za58) 
ya32(= %a59) 
T^he symbols shotwi in the parentheses were used for 
computing purposes. They allowed the use of non-negative 
activity levels and positive objective function weights. 
The X symbols also are easier to deal with in the 
discussions to be found in Chapter VII. 
P^or commodities a© and aoo 3ao constraints were 
included in the model (see Table 12), but had constraints 
been included they would have had the form y^ o = - ^ q.20 
and yaoo = - Zal9' 
- 4.9 
- 2.5 
-  2 .0  
- 5.0 
- 4.0 
- 0.12 
- 1.5 
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Table l4. Solution to department A model after imposition 
of quotas 
subscripts 
Solution 
value 
%a 
subscripts 
Solution 
value 
1 1.89 31 0.0 
2 5.46 32 8.32 
3 3.94 33 12.50 
4 0.43 34 0.43 
5 0.59 35 ,0.0 
6 0.0 36 0.0 
7 0.0 37 6.55 
8 0.0 38 1.75 
9 0.48 39 3.36 
10 0.0 40 2.16 
11 0.0 4l 3.94 
12 2.68 42 0.0 
13 0.0 43 0.20 
14 0.0 44 1.70 
15 0.54 45 0.85 
16 1.16 46 3.0 
17 0.0 47 0.16 
18 30.0 48 1.98 
19 5.49 49 0.86 
20 7.41 50 0.0 
21 6.5 51 1.50 
22 1.07 52 0.0 
23 1.20 53 0.53 
24 38.30 54 2.47 
25 0.0 55 5.0 
26 29.04 56 0.0 
27 0.0 57 0.0 
28 0.0 58 0.63 
29 0.0 59 27.72 
30 6.79 
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Table 15. Solution to the "dual of the department A model. 
Variable Solution value# Variable Solution valued 
Val .47 .855) Va24 1.249 (1.737) 
Va2 .042 .032) Va25 2.814 (2.862) 
.033 .047) Va26 6.193 (6.024) 
.047 .074) ^a27 5.980 (5.855) 
^a5 .059 .092) Va28 .004 (.033) 
Va6 .204 1.571) ^a29 .003 (.032) 
a^7 .204 1.571) Va30 .453 (.266). 
^a8 2.0 2.0) Va31 .120 (.120) 
Va9 5.0 5.0) Va32 1.500 (1.500) 
a^lO 4.0 4.0) ^a33 0.0 (.123) 
a^ll .204 1.571) Va34 26.804 (1.582) 
Val2 .204 1.571) Va35 1.277 (.252) 
•^ al3 .013 .169) T^a36 0.317 (.036) 
^al4 .038 .594) lOOV^ y^ 0.045 (.466) 
a^l5 .321 4.12) 1000Ta;)8 0.076 (1.020) 
Val6 .359 .381) 1000v^ 3^  0.126 (.076) 
•^ al7 .931 .874) lOOOVa^ o 0.345 (.311) 
Vais .779 .755) lOOOv^ l^ 0.349 (.319) 
Val9 .332 .269) Va42 0.0 (.020) 
^a20 .988 .975) va43 0.203 (529) 
^821 1.000 1.000) Va44 1.116 (2.301) 
Va22 .493 .909) Va45 0.965 (.779) 
Va23 1.236 1.709) Va46 1.041 (1.461) 
T^he values in parentheses are elements of the vector 
which solves the dual of 7.2 (version 2 of the college 
model• 
156 
XIII. APPENDIX B 
Table l6. Final products, department B. 
Commodity 
number Product description 
b ® Ph.D. degrees awarded by department 
B. 
boo® Masters* degrees awarded by 
department B. 
Training of undergraduate students 
majoring in discipline B. 1^ 
>^2 Instructions in the principles (I) 
of discipline B« 
bo Instruction in the principles (II) 
of discipline B. 
bj. Advanced undergraduate (or minor 
graduate) instruction in the 
general theory of discipline B. 
he Advanced undergraduate (or minor 
graduate) instruction in the applied 
theories of discipline B. 
C^ommodities bo and boo are commodities for 
included in the model. 
Units of measurement 
One degree per academic year. 
Same as above. 
One vindergraduate unit per year. 
One unit is the amount of instruc­
tion (and departmental administra­
tion) in discipline B which is 
required to produce one Bachelors' 
degree (in discipline B) per year. 
One instructional unit per year. 
An instructional unit is one (3 
quarter hours) course taught to one 
student. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above 
which no constraints have been 
Table l6, (Continued), 
Commodity 
number 
6^ 
b7 
b8 
ao 
ai 
Product description Units of measurement 
Graduate Instruction in the general 
theory of discipline B. 
Graduate instruction in the applied 
theories of discipline B, 
Faculty teaching services (advanced 
undergraduate or minor graduate 
teaching) rendered by "general theory'-
faculty members «. 
Faculty teaching services (advanced 
undergraduate or minor graduate 
teaching) rendered by "applied 
theories" faculty members. 
Faculty teaching services (graduate 
teaching) rendered by "general theory" 
faculty members. 
Faculty teaching services (graduate 
teaching) rendered by "applied 
theories" faculty members. 
One instructional unit per year. 
An instructional unit is one (3 
quarter hours) course taught to one 
student, 
Same as above. 
One unit of teaching per year. A 
unit of teaching is the amount 
required to teach (including pre­
paration) one (3 quarter houi.c) 
course. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
H 
CO 
bi2 Publications (non-project research) by One publication (10 published 
"general theory" faculty members, pages) per year. 
Table l6, (Continued). _ 
Commodity 
number Product description 
bjL3 Publications (project research) by 
"general theory" faculty members. 
b,j^  Publications (project research) by 
"applied theories" faculty members, 
b]^  ^ Publications (non-project research) 
by "applied theories" faculty member 
Units of measurement 
One publication (10 published 
pages) per year. 
Same as above® 
Same as above. 
Table 17. Intermediate products, department B. 
n^mbers^  Product description 
Faculty teaching services 
(principles I and II). 
b^ y Teaching services provided by 
graduate teaching assistants. 
bi8 Teaching services provided by 
graduate instructors, 
b^ g Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by teaching activities, 
b2o Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "general theory" research 
activities, 
b2i Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "applied theories" research 
activities, 
b22 Research services provided by 
"general theory" faculty members for 
non-project research, 
b2o Research services provided by 
"general theories" faculty members 
for project research, 
bgr Research services provided by 
"applied theories" faculty members for 
project research. 
Units of measurement 
Same as for bg. 
Same as for bg. 
Same as for bg. 
One woman year (9-10 months) 
per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
One man year (9=10 months) per 
year. 
Same as above. 
as above. 
Table 17. (Continued). 
Commodity. 
numbers Product description 
bg^  Research services provided by 
"applied theories" faculty members 
for non-project research. 
bg/ Counselling and advising of under­
graduate students. 
bgo Counselling and advising of 
graduate students. 
b2g Thesis (and related) supervision 
of graduate students. 
Units of measurement 
One man year (9-10 months) per 
year. 
One unit of counselling per 
year. One unit is the amount 
of advising required per 
(discipline B major) student 
per quarter. 
Same as above. 
The supervision of 3 thesis 
credit hours per year. 
o\ 
H 
Table 18, Primary products, department B, 
Commodity _ , . , . 
numbers Product description 
\>2^  Instruction provided by department 
B*s students by departments outside 
of B*s college. 
b^ Q Teaching services provided to 
department B by departments outisde 
of B*s college, 
b^ 2 Small classroom use. 
b^ 2 Office space use, 
b^  ^ Teaching budget funds, 
bo2^  Project research funds (general 
theory research), 
b^  ^ Project research funds (applied 
theories research), 
b^ 5 Masters* candidate, 
b^ y Ph.D. candidate, 
b^ Q "General theory" faculty members, 
3^9 "Applied theory" faculty members. 
Units of measurement 
Same as for bg. 
Same as for bg. 
One classroom unit per year. One 
unit is the amount (number of hours) 
of classroom use required to con» 
duct a class meeting one hour per 
week for one quarter. 
One square foot. 
One dollar per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
One new candidate per year. 
Same as above. 
One faculty member. 
Same as above. 
Table 19* Research activities. 
Special theory 
Activity research activities 
numbers b^  bg by 
Commodity 
numbers 
bg^ g ~»8 —1*0 
bj^  ^ —1#2 
1^5 
2^^  «1 * 2 
2^0 
2^1 
bgg 1*0 1»0 
b2^  1,0 
2^4 
2^5 
b^  ^ 500 
5^ 
H — « l a i » !  •  ! ' •  m p w w w i j a a m e — ; i — »  
uenerai theory 
research activities 
9^ 1^0 1^1 1^2 
I I I  i " ^  #  I I  I I I  I  I I I  m i l  B w  •  i  i i ,  i  i i  w i » i M i  ,  «  1 1  i T ' - f —  
—1*5 —1*6 
—1*0 —1*1 
*1 *2 
H 
o\ 
W 
*2 .3 
1*0 1.0 
1.0 1*0 
400 1000 
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Table 20. "Degree" activities. 
Activity numbers bi3 1^4 5^ 
Commodity 
numbers 
bl -1 
b2 1 
b3 4 
b4 6 
5^ 5 
6^ 6 7 
b7 4 6 
2^6 13 
2^7 6 10 
2^8 4 8 
2^9 3 7 
3^6 1 
b37 1 
Table 21. Advising, teaching, and thesis supervision activities. 
Actiyity 
numbers 
Commodity 
numbers 
2^ 
b3 
b4 
5^ 
7^ 
bg 
b9 
1^0 
hi 
bl6 
h 7 
h 8 
9^ 
2^6 
2^7 
2^8 
3^0 
3^1 
Undergraduate 
advising 
tl6 
.1 
-75.0 
.1 
•75.0 
Undergraduate teaching (principles) activities 
-35.0 -45.0 -35.0 -35.0 
.25 
.35 
.50 
.02 
1.05 
.02 
.25 
.85 
.02 
.35 
.75 
.02 
-35.0 -45.0 -35.0 
.45 
.15 
.45 
.02 
1.05 
.02 
.45 
.60 
.02 
H 0\ 
Table 21. (Continued), 
Undergraduate Graduate 
Activity teaching advising 
numbers 2^5 2^6 2^7 2^8 
Commodity 
numbers 
2^ 
b3 
b/j, —30*0 
b^ -30.0 
6^ 
by 
be 1.05 
b^  1.05 
1^0 1 
1^1 1 
h.6 
1^? 
1^8 
.02 .02 .4 .4 
2^6 
b2y -100.0 -100.0 
2^8 
3^0 
bji 3 3 
teaching thesis supervision 
2^9 3^0 3^l 
-15.0 
-15.0 
H 
1»05 ,45 
1.05 .5 
,02 .02 .02 
-7.0 
.10 
3 3 
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Table 22. Graduate student appointments activities. 
Activity numbers b^ 2 b^  ^ b^ i^  b^  ^
Commodity numbers 
1^7 -5 -5 
bi8 -5 -5 
b^ 2 40 40 60 60 
b33 2750 2750 3200 3200 
b^ ô -#6 -.5 
b^ y —•3 —*25 
16? 
Table 23. Secretarial activities. 
Activity numbers b^é b^y b^g 
Commodity numbers 
bi9 -1 
2^0 
b2i -1 
b^ 2 140 140 140 
b33 3400 
b^  ^ 3400 
3^6 3400 
Table 2 k ,  Faculty allocation activities. 
"General theory" faculty 
Activity allocation activities 
numbers b^  ^ b2j,o i^j-l ^^ 2 ^^ 3 
Commodity 
numbers 
bg —5»0 —3*0 —1*0 
b9 
b]^ Q —2*0 —l^ O —4*0 
bll 
b-j^ g —2*0 —5*0 —4^ 0 
bgg 1 —*2 — » 2 — * 2 —1*0 
2^3 
2^4 
2^5 
b^ 2 125 125 125 125 
b^ 3 -13000 13000 13000 13000 13000 
>^3^  ^ 13000 
b35 
b38 1 111 
3^9 
"Applied theories" faculty 
allocation activities 
biiAj, b2j.5 b45 b4? hi^Q 
—5*0 —3*0 —1*0 
—2*0 —1*0 —4*0 
—2*0 —5*0 —4*0 
H 
ON 00 
-1 
1 — * 2  — * 2  — * 2  —1*0 
125 125 125 125 
13500 13500 13500 13500 13500 
13500 
1 1 1 1  
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Table 25. Constraints, department B. 
Commodity constraints^  Reason for constraint 
yt)i — — 120 » 0 
yb2 ~ ~ 6900» 
yb3 = - ^ 700 
yb4 = - ^ 53.83 
y^  ^— - 900 
y-^  ^ — "" 200 » 62 
— - 225 
YbS - - 1'98 
b^9 ~ 
b^lO - -
b^ll ® - 3.0 
AbiZb - ybi = 0 i = 12,13, 
14,15 
y^ j^  — 0 i = 16,17» ••••28 
Abi^ b - Ybi - 0 i = 29,30 
yb3i = 1439•73 
y-jj^ 2 ~ 8805• 89 
yb33 = 603,863.63 
^b34 ~ 20,000 
Fixed target 
If 
It 
Accounting constraint 
Intermediate product 
(accounting) constraint 
Resource allocation granted 
to department A by the 
college dean 
Same as above 
II 
Resource constraint imposed 
by non-university sources of 
research funds• 
ay-bi = A^ Z^b for i = 1,2,3^ ..39 where Abi is the ith 
row of A^ . 
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Table 25. (Continued). 
Commodity constraintsa 
yb35 = 25,000 
0 = 3^ b36 = 4.0 
0  —  —  8 * 0  
Yb^ S l6*0 
yb39 ~ 17*5 
Reason for constraints 
Resource constraints 
imposed by non-university 
sources of research funds. 
Constraints due to 
students* decisions about 
graduate school attendance 
Same as above 
Numbers of faculty posi­
tions authorized by the 
university president. 
Same as above 
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Table 26, Objective function weights associated with 
flexible targets, department B. 
Symbols used for flexible 
target levels^  Objective function weights 
ybo(= - ^ bis)^  -4.75 
yboo(= - :^ bl4)^  -2.45 
ybi2(= -
-1.5 
ybl3(= - %) -2.25 
ybl4^ ~ "• b^^ ) -2.5 
ybl5^ '^  ~ ^ b4) -2.0 
yb29(- ^ 49) -0.12 
0
 
M 0 —1 » 5 
s-The symbols shotm in the parentheses were used for 
computing purposes since they allowed the use of only non-
negative activity levels and the use of positive objective 
function weights, z symbols are also easier to deal with 
in the discussions to be found in Chapter VII. 
F^or commodities b^  and bpg no constraints were 
included in the model (see Table 25), but had constraints 
been included they would have had the form ybo = - 2:^ 15 
and. Yboo = - %bl4' 
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Table 2?. Solution to 
"imposed. 
department B model after quotas are 
subscript 
Solution 
value subscript 
Solution 
value 
1 1.40 26 50.00 
2 1.73 27 1.44 
3 2.57 28 0.0 
k 1.79 29 21.20 
5 1.75 30 21.01 
6 0.0 31 15.40 
7 1.45 32 0.0 
8 0.0 33 18.48 
9 1.71 34 0.0 
10 0.0 35 33.38 
11 1.79 36 12.92 
12 0.0 37 0.14 
13 120.0 38 0.34 
14 9.24 39 1.45 
15 8.86 4o 10.61 
16 20.8 41 2.72 
17 0.0 42 2.67 
18 • 200.57 43 0.0 
19 0.0 44 1.71 
20 0.0 45 4.19 
21 0.0 46 9.62 
22 148.00 47 3.69 
23 0.0 48 0.0 
24 0.0 49 89.71 
25 39.13 50 2.31 
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Table 28, Solution to the dual of department B model. 
Variable Solution valued , Variable Solution value& 
Vbl 1.135 (1.208) b^20 3.369 4.363) 
b^2 0.019 (0.033) b^21 3.338 4.337) 
b^3 0.027 (0.038) b^22 .900 0.788) 
b^4 0.060 (0.062) b^23 2.309 1.718) 
0.060 (0.062) Vb24 3.043 2.449) 
Vb6 0.121 (0.123) b^25 1.700 1=588) 
•^ b7 0.121 (0.123) b^26 0.026 0.027) 00 1.669 (1.582) b^27 0.029 0.032) 
•^ b9 1.669 (1.582) b^28 0.257 0.248) 
"^ blO 1.669 (1.582) b^29 .120 0.120) 
Vbll 1.669 ^ (1.582) •^ b30 1.5 1.5) 
b^l2 1.500 (1.500) b^3l 0.0 0.036) 
"^ 13 2.250 (1.500) 100Vb32 2.143 0.466) 
b^l4 2.500 (2.500) lOOOVb^  ^ 0.0 1.020) 
b^l5 2.000 (2.000) lOOOVy^  ^ 0.108 1.092) 
Vbl6 1.669 (1.582) lOOOv^ ^^  0.099 1.084) 
b^l7 .203 (0.631) b^36 -0.3166 -0.329) 
•^ bl8 .257 (0.709) Vb37 0.0 0.0) 
1^9 3.000 (4.120) Vb38 12.524 0.552) 
Vb39 12.684 0.202) 
T^he values in parentheses are elements of the vector 
which solves the dual of 7.2 (version 2 of the college model). 
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Table 29. Bachelors" degree activity. 
Activity number ci^ g 
Commodity Commodity Commodity 
number numbers numbers 
(dept. models) (version one) (version two) 
c^  ^ -1 
ai C39 11 «12 
b]_ c^ Q 49 «^ 8 
e^  82 «40 
a2 C2 12 2 
a3 C3 1 1,5 
bg Cij. 50 1 
b^  c^  51 *5 
b^ i, c^  2 .5 
b^  Cy 52 *3 
©2 eg 83 1 
e^  C9 84 .7 
ClO 85 .2 
e^  c^ i 86 o 3 
I 9^9^  • 35 
C^ommodity c% is Bachelors* degrees. The unit of 
measurement is one degree per year. 
C^ommodity C99 is instruction received by undergraduate 
students outside of the college. The unit of measurement is 
one (3 quarter hours) instructional unit per year. 
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Table 30. Cross resefesrenûe, college commodity numbers 
(verslonci 1)9 and departmental commodity mmbers, 
final pnrodUictS' (from college viewpoint). 
CoioommQdlty numbers used in the model of 
Dep-trt. Dept. Dept. Econ, 
A. _ _ B D dept. 
College 
commodity 
numbers 
la 
2 2 
3 3 38 
4 2 
5 3 
6 4 39 
7 5 
8 2 
9 3 
10 4 
11 5 
12 4 
13 5 
14 33 6 
15 7 
l6 6 
17 7 
18 8 
19 6 
20 7 
21 8 
22 9 
23 34 10 
24 11 
25 9 
26 10 
27 11 
28 8 
C^ollege oommo<i;£iity* one is B.S, degrees. The unit of 
measurement is onea.@.esree per year. 
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Table 30. (Continued). 
Commodity numbers used in the model of 
Dept. Dept. Dept. Econ. 
_ A B D dept. 
College 
commodity 
numbers 
29 9 
30 10 
31 12 
32 13 
33 14" 
34 15 
35 12 
36 13 
37 • 14 
38 15 
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Table 31. Cross reference, college commodity numbers 
(version 1) and departmental commodity numbers, 
intermediate products (from college viewpoint). 
College Commodity numbers used in the model of 
commodity Dept. Dept. Dept. Econ. 
numbers A B "D" dept. 
39 1 
40 1 
41 1 
42 11 
43 12 
44 13 
45 14 
46 15 
47 16 
48 17 
49 18 
50 19 
51 l6 
52 17 
53 18 
54 19 
55 20 
56 21 
57 22 
58 16 
59 17 
60 18 
61 19 
62 20 
63 21 
64 22 
65 23 
66 24 
67 25 
68 26 
69 27 
70 20 
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Table 31* (Continued). 
College Commodity numbers used in the model of 
commodity Dept. Dept. Dept. Scon. 
number A B "D" Dept. 
71 21 
72 22 
73 23 
74 24 
75 25 
76 23 
77 24 
78 25 
79 26 
80 27 
81 28 
82 29 
83 30 
84 31 
85 32 
86 33 
87 28 
88 - 29 
89 26 
90 27 
91 34 
92 35 
93 30 
94 28 
95 36 
96 37 
97 36 31 1 43 
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Table 32. Cross reference, college commodity number 
(version 1) and departmental commodity numbers, 
primary products (from college viewpoint). 
College Commodity numbers used in the model of 
commodity Dept. Dept. Dept. Econ. 
numbers A 3 *^ 0" dept. 
98^  
99 31 
100 29 
101 32 
102 30 
103 35 2 42 
104 3 
105 37 32 44 
106 38 33 4 45 
107 • 39 
108 40 
109 41 
110 34 
111 35 
112 46 
113 47 
114 48 
115 42 
116 43 
117 36 
118 37 
119 49 
120 50 
121 51 
122 52 
123 44 
124 45 
125 46 
126 38 
C^ollege commodity a^  is teaching provided to the 
undergraduate students of the college being considered by 
departments in other colleges. The unit of measurement is 
one instructional unit per year. 
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Table 32. (Continued)» 
College Commodity numbers used in the model of 
commodity ... Dept. Dept. Dept. Econ. 
numbers A B "D" dept. 
127 39 
128 53 
129 - 54 
130 55 
131 56 
132 57 
Table 33» Cross reference between college and 
(version one) 
Co 
act 
lege 
vlty 
no. 
Research 
activities 
"Degree" 
activities 
Teaching 
activities 
Graduate 
student 
appointment 
activities 
Secretarial 
activities 
Faculty 
activities 
Space activities 
Resource importing 
activities 
4 
Dept. 
A 
no. 
1-31 
1-39 
1-57 
1-93 
1-100 
1-135 
departmental activity numbers 
Dept. Dept. Dept. 
B "D" E i = 
no, no. no. 
1 to 17 
1-17 18 to 29 
1-29 30 to 47 
48 
49 to 51 
1-39 52 to 54 
1-36 55 to 59 
60 to 72 
1-57 
1-65 
73 to 88 
89 to 107 
108 to 116 
1-85 117 to 120 
1-78 121 to 135 
136 to 139 
1-104 l4o to 142 
1-85 143 to l46 
14? to 157 
1-119 158 to 167 
1-106 168 to 188 
1-188 189 to 192 
193 to 194 
i"l46 195 to 196 
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Table 34. Constraints, college model (version one). 
Commodity constraint^  Reason for constraint 
yd = - 250 Fixed target 
yc2 - - 900 " " 
yc3 = - 350 " •• 
7^ 4 - - 6650 " 
7^ 5 = - 4575 " " 
yc6 - - 275 
= - 825 « « 
y^ g A _ 2750 " 
y^ g - - 525 
Fcio = - 150 
Poll = - 225 
ycl2 = - 85 
yci3 = - 100 
yci4 - - 160 " " 
yci5 = - 225 " » 
ycl6 - - 15 
Yd? - - 40 
ycl8 = - 75 
ycl9 - - '75 
fcZO - - 2. 
yc2i = - 1.25 
yc22 = - 1 " 
H 
M 
M 
M 
M 
*^ Gl ~ ^ cl^ c i — 1» 2 « • 132* 
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Table 34. (Continued). 
Commodity constraint^  Reason for constraint 
yc23 ~ - 2.75 
yc24.- - 3 
• yc25 = - 4 
0^26 - - 2 
yc27 - - s 
Aci^ c - ^ ci ^  3- = 28 to 38 
Yci = 0, i = 39 to 97 
Fixed target 
7098 = 8750 
AciXc - Fci = 0' 1 = 99 
ycl03 = 27 
ycl04 - 25 
ycl05 - 19125 
ycl06 = 1,095,000 
ycl07 - 21.000 
ycl08 = 70,000 
ycl09 ^ 40,000 
yClio ~ 20,000 
y^lll = 25,000 
ycll2 = 7200 
Accounting constraint 
Intermediate product (account­
ing) constraint 
Resource allocation granted 
by university president 
to 102 Primary product (accounting) 
constraint 
Resource allocation granted 
by university president 
Same as above 
II II M 
n w M 
Constraint imposed by non-
university sources of research 
funds 
Resource constraints imposed 
by non-university sources of 
research funds. 
Same as above 
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Table 34. (Continued), 
Commodity constraints a Reason for constraint 
yell] = 80,000 
yoll4 - 125,000 
0 = yoii5 = 2 
0 - Telia = 4 
 ^- yell? = ^  
0 = ycii8 = 8 
0 = yoii9 = ^  
0 - yol20 = 8 
0 = fcizi - 3 
0 = ycl22 = 4 
ycl23 ~ 3 
0^124 
yci25 
ycl26 
ycl27 
ycl28 
yol29 
yci3o 
yci3i 
yci32 
4.5 
5 
16 
17.5 
5 
2 
6.5 
8 
3 
Resource constraints 
imposed by non-university 
sources of research funds. 
Same as above 
Constraints due to students* 
decisions about graduate 
school attendance 
Same as above 
Numbers of faculty positions 
authorized by the university 
president 
Same as above 
H M 
It 
It 
It 
M 
It 
M 
It II 
H II 
II It 
H II 
(I m 
It It 
M II 
186 
Table 35» Objective function weights associated with 
flexible targets, collose model (version one) 
Symbols used for flexible . .. . , , . , , 
target levels^  Oojective function weights 
yo28 (- %cl) - 2 
Fczg (- %o2) - -5 
7c30 (- Z03) - 4 
c^31 %cl8) " 
c^32 X0I9) - 2*25 
yc33 (- %c2o) - 2.5 
9034 (- %c2l) - 2-0 
0^35 %c30) " 2.0 
0^36 (- Xc3l) - 2.0 
c^37 0^32) "" 
9038 (- =033) " 4.0 
c^50 2.5 
c^5l 4.9 
Xc53 2.45 
=054 4.75 
=056 2*4 
Zc57 2.4 
=o58 .4.8 
XQ59 4.8 
yc99 (~ ZciBi) + 0.12 
T^he symbols shown in the parentheses were used for 
computing purposes. They allowed the use of non-negative 
activity levels and positive objective function weights. 
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Table 35*- (Continued), 
Symbols used for flexible 
target levels^ Objective function weights 
yclOO (- Zcisz)  
c^lOl (- %cl83) 0*12 
c^lOS "^ 0184"^  1®5 
Table 36» Cross reference college commodity numbers (version two) and 
departmental commodity numbers» 
College Deptc A Dept. B Dept. "D" Dept. E 
commodity commodity commodity commodity commodity 
numbers numbers numbers numbers numbers 
1 3 38 
2 4 39 
3 33 6 
4 6 40 
5 8 41 
6 34 10 
7 36 31 2 43 
8 35 1 
9 37 32 44 
10 38 33 4 45 
11 1 
12 2 
13 4 
14 5 
i 1-8 i=15 to 40 
1 1-2 i=4l to 48 
49 1 
50 - 2 
51 3 
52 5 
53 7 
54 9 
1 1-44 1=55 to 74 
1 1-41 1=75 to 80 
Table 36. (Continued),, 
•i*r~MTim-ir II ni*" w •••imi n ii i i ii mu ii n» i i » i,*, iiini , mu mi •• —u——-1 
College 
commodity 
number 
81 
i 
Dept. A 
commodity 
numbers 
Dept, B 
commodity 
numbers 
i 
Dept. "D" Dept. E 
commodity commodity 
numbera numbers 
1-81 1=82 to 118 
1-73 1=119 to 130 
H 03 VÛ 
Table 3?. 
College 
activity 
number 
Cross reference college activity nimbors (version two) and department 
activity numbers. 
Dept. A 
activity 
number 
Dept. B 
activity 
number 
Dept. "D" 
activity 
number 
Dept. E 
activity 
number 
i = 
i 
i 1-59 
1-109 
1-113 
1 to 59 
6o to 109 
110 to 113 
m to 195 
H 
VO O 
191 
Table 38• Constraints, college model (version two). 
Commodity constraint^  Reason for constraint 
yi = - 725 
72 = - 4-00 
73 = - 160 
74 = - *75 
75 = - 1.25 
76 = - 2.75 
77 = 0 
rs = 27 
79 = 19125 
710 - 1,095,000 
711 - - 30 
712 = - 1400 
713 - - 85 
71 = - 100 
7^  ^^  — 2.0 
A^ x - 7i = 0, 1=16,17,18 
7j_ = 0, 1=19 to 38 
= 0, 1=39,40 
Fixed target 
Intermediate product 
(accounting) constraint 
Resource allocation granted 
by universit7 president 
Same as above 
Fixed target constraints 
faced onl7 b7 department A 
Same as above 
Accounting constraints (final, 
intermediate and primar7 
products) faced onl7 b7 
department A 
Same as above 
7^4 = A,x for 1 = 1, 2 . . . 130. 
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Table 38., (Continued). 
Commodity constraint^  Reason for constraint 
y^ l = 21,000 
y42 = 70,000 
•yij.3 = 40,000 
0 = y^ Zf = 2 
0 = y43 = 4 
746 = 3 
yj^ y = 4.5 
748 = 5 
y49 = - 120 
750 = - 6900 
751 - - 4700 
5^2 ^  ~ 900 
y^3 = - 225 
754 = - 1 
755 = - 3 
- y^  = 0, 1=56 to 59 
y^ = 0, 1-60 to 72 
A^ x — yj^  = 0, 1=73,74 
y^  ^— 20,000 
776 = 25.,.0.00 
Primary product constraint 
faced only by department A 
Same as above 
Fixed target constraints faced 
only by department B 
Same as above 
Accounting constraints (final, 
intermediate, and primary 
products) faced only by depart­
ment B 
Same as above 
M M M 
Resource constraints faced only 
by department B 
Same as above 
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Table 38. (Continued) 
Commodity constraint^  Reason for constraint 
0 = 
7^7 4 
7^8 é 8 
7^9 
= 16 
780 = 17.5 
781 
< 25 
782 
•a. 
- 100 
783 - 3000 
784 - 700 
785 
£ 
- 200 
786 à - 300 
3^ 87 - 15 
788 
£ 
- 40 
789 
g. 
- 75 
9^0 é - 4 
791 à - 2 
792 
•c 
- 8 
' yi 6 0, 1=93 
yi = 0, i=97 to 118 
— 7200 
y^ 20 ~ 80,000 
Resource constraints faced only 
by department B 
Same as above 
M II M 
M «I 
Resource constraint faced only 
by department "D" 
Fixed target constraints faced 
only by department E 
Same as above 
It M M 
M 
M 
M 
tt 
M 
H 
M 
M M 
M M 
Il M 
M M 
M M 
H m 
Accounting constraints (final 
and intermediate products) faced 
only by department E 
Same as above 
Resource constraints faced 
only by department E 
Same as above . 
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Table 38. (Continued), 
Commodity constraint* Reason for constraint 
7121 = 125»000 Resource constraints faced 
only by department E 
0 = yi22 ^  ^  Same as above 
0 = 7^ 23 = 8 « « H 
0 = yi24 =3 « " " 
0 = yi25 = 4 Same as above 
yi26 = 5 
7127 = 2 
yi28 = 6.5 
1^29 ~ 8.0 
1^30 ="3.0 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
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Table 39» Objective function weights associated with 
flexible targets, college model (version two). 
Symbols used for flexible 
target levelsa Objective function weights 
yci6 (- - 2 
717 (- %2) - 5 
yi8 (- 3C3) - 4 
=19 2.5 
=20 4.9 
739 (- Zjg) 0.12 
740 5^9) 1.5 
^56 (- =60) - 1.5 
y57 (- =61) - 2.25 
5^8 (- =62) - 2.5 
759 (- Z63) - 2.0 
=73 2.45 
=74 4.75 
7^3^ " =108^  0.12 
y74(- ^ 109) 1.5 
793 (- Z114) - 2 
794 (- xiij) - 2 
9^5 (- =116) - 4 
y$6 (- =117) - 4 
=133 2.4 
•^The symbols shown in the parentheses were used for 
computing. They allowed the use of non-negative activity 
levels and positive objective function weights. 
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Table 3.9« (Continued). 
Symbols used for flexible 
target levels® Objective function weights 
=134 
=135 
=136 
2.4 
4.8 
4.8 
Table 40. Solution to the dual of the college dean's problem. 
Phase number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
lOvl 1.0 .3 .168 0 .001 0 .10 .02 .85 1.00 .65 
10v2 1.0 .35 .35 .35 .015 .012 .12 1.60 .77 .50 .60 
10v3 1.0 1.0 .7 0 *017 .08 1.60 1.97 1.95 .99 1.21 
V4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0 0 .14 0 0 3.37 3.84 1.94 
5^ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 .039 0 0 4.48 2.07 1.22 1.50 
6^ 1.0 1.0 1.0 0 .020 .08 1.95 2.72 2.66 1.22 1.50 
.037 .017 0 .09 5.27 .04 3.13 .21 
lOvg .015 .06 .61 .13 .26 .37 .37 
lOOVg 0 0 0 0 1.02 1.83 
lOOOvio .25 2.44 .85 .74 1.05 1.06 
<ll —1.0 —1.0 —1.0 -.727 -.59 -22.37 -364.35 -119.23 19.82 -32.76 -73.90 
2^ —1 » 0 —1.0 —1.0 9.31 -1.0 -111.63-1449.87 -357.05 -337.83 -657.71 -726.34 
3^ -1.0 —1.0 0 0 2.73 11.92 114.16 23.76 54.44 76.51 77.41 
q4 —1.0 -1.0 
-.535 -1.0 -1.0 -77.30 -832.53 -292.31 -133.59 -372.06 -349.64 
Table 40. (Continued). 
Phase number 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
lOvi .62 .49 .44 .50 .45 .47 .46 .41 .46 
10v2 .59 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 ,62 .62 
10v3 1.17 1.23 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.24 1,24 
1.85 1.63 1.49 1.68 1.50 1.56 1.54 1.37 1.52 
^5 1.46 1.57 1.61 1.58 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.61 1.59 
1.46 1.57 1.60 1.58 1.59 1.59 1.59 1,61 1.59 
. 7? 2.11 .26 .35 .30 .23 .27 .25 .25 .25 
lovg .43 .33 .37 .35 .34 .37 .36 .34 .35 
lOOVg .38 1.33 0 .64 .53 .23 .21 .08 .38 
lOOOvio 1.22 .95 1.06 .99 .98 1.06 1.04 0.97 1.00 
qi -52.90 -49.95 -27.41 -31.72 -31.08 -30.66 -28.62 -19.36 -29.50 
q2 -•704.30 -609.03 -561.89 -575.14 -599.19 -581.16 -570.27 -513.63 -563.21 
^3 89.13 69.48 77.38 72.45 71.80 77.22 76.23 71.16 73.78 
qzf -.354.36 -271.60 -218.51 -239.15 -224.79 -232.19 -225.05 -189.46 -224.35 
Table 40. (Continued). 
lOvi 
IOV2 
lOVg 
5^ 
?6 
Y? 
IOV3 
lOOv^  
lOOOv^ o 
1^ 
2^ 
43 
44 
Phase number 
21 22 
.47 .47 
.62 .62 
1.23 1.23 
1.57 1,57 
1.58 1.58 
1.58 1.58 
.25 .25 
.36 .36 
.45 .47 
1.02 1,02 
-32.60 
-32.67 
579.13 -578.52 
74.80 74.59 
235.15 -235.07 
VO VO 
Table 4-1, Quotas requested by department A. 
Phase number 
1^  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 14.85 9.39 38.89 10,6l 153.47 74.0 81.82 102.93 93.53 
1/lOUai -500.0 15.0 -500.0 15.0 17.66 15.47 15.53 15.49 15.33 
Ua3 1.34 .84 3.45 .95 9.53 2.84 2.95 5.20 4.37 
1.05 83.89 -41.48 85.32 -41.4l -14.80 -7.58 -11.93-38.06 -38.81 
%6 .411 .26 1.06 .294 2.93 .88 .91 I.60 1.35 
"a7 19'75 19.75 0 0 19.75 19.75 0 19.75 0 
1/lOu^g .3 59.09 14.74 68.20 22.69 19.71 15.82 23.79 16.85 24.32 
l/l00Ug2 .028 32.26 25.06 30.33 23.86 53.18 25.53 26.61 34.50 33.20 
l/lOOOUaio 'O68 174.42 147.66 174.66 146.81 273.88 93.40 100.35 149.35 146.84 
•^Based on a homogeneous solution. 
Table 4l. (Continued) 
Phase number 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
ôa 83.03 87.73 83.10 89.80 103.79 91.93 92.84 106.81 109.34 107.73 
1/lOuai -500.0 -500.0 15.53 15.55 -500,0 -500.0 -500.0 -500.0 -500.0 -500.0 
%3 3.26 3.56 3.24 3.78 5.25 3.93 4.01 5.51 5.77 5.59 
a^4 94.64 101.96 -30.32 -26.23 87.14 103.II 103.57 88.54 89.79 89.00 
%a6 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.16 1.62 1.21 1.23 1.70 1.77 1.72 
19.75 0 0 0 0 19.75 0 19.75 0 0 
1/I0ua8 60.08 68.14 23.92 24.16 68.90 60.49 68.45 61.18 69.22 69.14 g 
l/lC0ua9 35.81 36.29 29.00 30.23 41.63 36.32 36.59 41.47 41.97 41.47 
l/lOOOUaio 151.14 144.93 126.95 124.69 177.82 144.27 146.31 176.05 178.20 178.09 
N) 
Table 42. Quotas requested by department B. 
Phase number 
la 2a 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Kb 48.47 44.63 43.91 138.77 55.25 66.24 66. 24 104.42 53.84 
l/lOUb2 -3.0 72.0 72.0 72.0 72.0 72.0 72.0 72. 0 72.0 72.0 
l/lOUb2 -1.5 9.07 9.93 8.22 28.93 9.98 11.38 11. 38 19.67 8.81 
1.05 -34.51 -48.0 -48.0 3.31 4.80 -57.48 -12. 82 -27.20 -27.20 
*b6 1.05 -36.38 -8.75 -9.96 -42.08 -57.0 -12.68 -57. 33 -1.65 -9.88 
1/I0u^8 .3 .3 125.63 122.77122.77 128.41 121.82 125.81 125. 81 122.65 118.46 
l/lOOu^ g .028 .028 88.77 82.55 85.47 96.88 81.84 86.56 86. 56 82.52 78.47 
l/lOOOUy Q^ .068 .068 603.51 580. 587.01 661.20 576.14 600.23 600. 23 576.31 558.66 
B^ased on homogeneous solutions. 
Table 42. (Continued). 
Phase number 
12 13 ^ 
101,87 
1/Ï0u^ 2 72,0 
1/I0ub3 18.15 
*b5 -44.15 
Ub6 -10.48 
l/lOu^ g 126.97 
1/1OOu^  ^ 87.28 
l/lOOOUbio 601.97 
65.72 65.71 
72.0 72.0 
11.38 11.38 
-33.22 -57.48 
-36.93 -12.68 
125.81 125.81 
86,32 86.32 
599.63 599.64 
15 
65.72 
72.00 
11.38 
-56.55 
-13.61 
125.81 
86,32 
599.64 
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Table 4]. Quotas requested by department D. 
__1 5 7 
Ud7 10.0 
1/I0u^j3 -187.5 262.5 -1.0 -225.0 
1/iooouaio 13.75 5.625 
^Based on a homogeneous solution. 
Table 44. Quotas requested by department E. 
2 4 5 6 
Phase number 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
10.54 22.59 12.13 221.15 96.09 217.90 198.30 136.60 135.23 135.23 
l/lOUgl ,88 2.35 1.26 15.83 2,42 15.85 13.73 5.54 6.26 6.26 
l/10Ug2 .44 .94 .51 6.62 ,87 6.46 5.59 2.72 2.52 2.58 
^e4 .16 .40 .22 2.59 .35 2.61 2.19 1.03 .99 1.03 
Ue5 .07 .10 .05 .93 .11 .84 .79 .42 .36 0.35 
«e? 21.08 0 17.06 26.4 26.4 0 26.4 0 26.4 26.4 
1/10*08 42.97 67.32 46.59 54.86 45.61 82.41 51.40 77.87 47.48 47.48 
l/lOOUep 43.34 52.25 44.58 84.62 64.15 86.82 71.44 77.53 55.44 66,89 
1/lOOOuiQ 334.57 375.72 340.14 416.97 285.89 421.62 353.83 360.64 302.85 303.69 
Table 44. (Continued) 
Phase number 
13 14 15 16 17 
%e 150.75 195.76 180 .87 197.57 165.48 
1/lOuei 8,15 13.69 11 .75 13.85 10.06 
1/10*62 3.48 5.43 4 .81 5.55 3.97 
Ue4 1.37 2.16 1 .88 2.19 1.58 
*e5 0.49 0.74 0 .69 0.77 0.54 
«e? 26.4 26.4 26 .4 26.4 26.4 
1/10*68 48.49 51.17 50 .32 51.34 49.25 
1/I00ue9 64.51 7.69 68 .61 70.64 68.68 
1/ÏOOOuiQ 317.36 351.44 340 .03 353.10 327.31 
18 21 
195.16 170.45 
13.62 10.65 
5.40 4.21 
2.14 1.67 
0.73 .0.58 
26.4 26.4 
51.15 49.56 
70.96 69.06 
350.98 331.25 
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Table 45. An optimum set of quotas. 
b^j , , e^j  ^
(Dept. A) (Dept. B) (Dept. D) (Dept. E) 
1 -860.85 0.0 0.0 135.85 
2 0.0 -453.83 0.0 53.83 
3 • 40.63 -200.62 0.0 0.0 
4 -2.89 0.0 0.0 2.14 
5 0.0 -1.98 0.0 0.73 
6 1.25 -4.00 0.0 0.0 
7 327.56 1439.73 -2278.61 511.33 
8 0.6 0.0 0.0 26.4 
9 3226.20 8805.89 0.0 7093.00 
10 133,750.62 603,863.63 6,626.44 350,763.53 
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Table 46. Upper and lower bound estimate of the optimum 
value of the college dean's objective function. 
Phase Lower bound estimate^  Upper bound estimate^  
6 76.96 438.79 
7 94.02 438.79 
8 213.23 438.79 
9. 282.34 405.39 
10 323.28 402.31 
11 345.20 402.31 
12 346.45 402.31 
13 352.97 358.62 
14 353.23 355.65 
15 354.52 355.65 
16 354.79 355.65 
17 355.00 355.64 
18 355.02 355.64 
19 355.13 355.64 
20 355.15 355.32 
21 355.16 355.19 
22 355.17 355.17 
T^he lower bound estimate at the end of the kth phase 
was obtained by setting it equal to the value attained by 
the objective function of (the kth phase version of) 7.15. 
T^he upper bound estimate at the end of the kth phase 
was obtained by setting it equal to 
 ^ n 
min (v Z ^  ^ where 
6=j=k i=l 
<3) = Hi, <3> + 91 . 
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Table 4?. An optimal solution to the dual of 7.15 (obtained 
after classroom use constraints were removed.) 
Variable Solution value 
lOV]^  0,38 
10vg 0.60 
IOV3 1.20 
vzj, 1.38 
v^ 1.65 
V5 1.65 
Vy 0.0 
vg 0.0 
0.08 
1^0 I'Ol 
• -12.45 
Q.B -485*55 
Qg —176.10 
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Table 48. An optimal set of quotas (obtained after class­
room use constraints were removed.) 
j *aj Uej 
1 -862,75 0.0 137.75 
2 0.0 
-454.99 54.99 
3 41.57 -201.56 0.0 
4 
-2.93 0.0 2.18 
5 0.0 -2.01 0.76 
6 1.28 -4.03 0.0 
7 19.75 0.0 26.40 
8 251.18 1439.84 512.70 
9 3228.43 8805.33 7091.25 
10 132,531.51 603,849.96 352,354.69 
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Table 49. Space allocation "department" activities. 
Activity 
numbers 
Small Commodity' 
classroom numbers 
units dl -75 -90 -105 -1 
Large 
classroom 
units d2 
Small 
classrooms d^ 
Teaching 
budget 
funds d/t 225 750 
Table 50. Solution to department D model after constraints 
are imposed. 
subscript Solution value 
1 0.0 
2 23.09 
3 1.91 
4 0 .0  
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Table 51» Solution to the dual of the department D model, 
Variable Solution value^ 
0.0 (0.036) 
v^2 0.0 (O.252) 
0.0 (2.983) 
1000v^ 2j. 0.0 (1.020) 
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Table 52. Final products, Economics department. 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
e a 
Goo* 
©coo 
®oooo®^  
Hi.D. degrees (specialty one) 
awarded by the Economics 
department• 
Hi«D. degrees (specialty two) 
awarded by the Economics 
department. 
Masters* degrees (specialty 
one) awarded by the Economics 
department. 
Masters* degrees (specialty 
two) awarded by the Economics 
department. 
Training of undergraduate 
Economics majors. 
Instruction in Economics 
Principles. 
Undergraduate instruction 
(specialty one). 
One degree per academic year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
One undergraduate unit per year. One 
unit is the amount of instruction 
(and departmental administration) in 
Economics which is required to produce 
one Bachelors' (in Economics) degree 
per year. 
One instructional unit per year. An 
instructional unit is one (3 quarter 
hours) course taught to one student. 
Same as above. 
^Commodities e^ through e^onn are commodities for which no constraints have 
been included in the model. 
Table 52. (Continued). 
Commodity 
number Product description 
ei|. Undergraduate instruction 
(specialty two). 
ec Undergraduate instruction 
(specialty three). 
65 Graduate instruction 
(specialty one). 
ey Graduate instruction 
(specialty two). 
eg Graduate instruction 
(specialty three). 
en Faculty teaching services 
(graduate teaching, specialty 
one ). 
e^i^Q Faculty teaching services 
(graduate teaching, specialty 
two). 
«11 Faculty teaching services 
(graduate teaching, specialty 
three). 
e,2 Publications (non-project 
research) by "specialty one" 
faculty members. 
Unit of measurement 
One instructional unit per year. An 
instructional unit is one (3 quarter 
hours) course taught to one student. 
Same as above. 
H M M 
M H It 
N M H 
One unit of teaching per year* A unit 
of teaching is the amount required to 
teach (including preparation) one (3 
quarter hours) course. 
Same as above. 
<1 M fl 
One publication (25 pages) per year. 
Table 52. (Continued). 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
®13 Publications (project research) 
by "specialty one" faculty 
members. 
One publication (25 pages) per year. 
Gl4 Faculty publications in specialty 
area two. 
Same as above. 
®15 Faculty publications in specialty 
area three. 
« M n 
ro 
H 
Table 53• Intermediate products, Economics department 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
®16 
6X7 
®18 
®19 
®20 
®21 
®22 
®23 
624 
®25 
Faculty teaching services (under­
graduate teaching, principles). 
Faculty teaching services (under­
graduate teaching, specialty one). 
Faculty teaching services (under­
graduate teaching, specialty two). 
Faculty teaching services (under­
graduate teaching, specialty three). 
Teaching services provided by 
graduate instructors. 
Teaching services provided by 
graduate teaching assistants. 
Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by teaching activities. 
Research assistance (specialty two 
research) provided by Masters* 
candidates, 
Research assistance (specialty three 
research) provided by Masters' 
candidates. 
Research assistance (specialty two 
research) provided by.Ph.D. candidates. 
Same as for e^ . 
Same as for e^ . 
Same as for e,^ . 
Same as for e^ . 
Same as for e^ . 
One unit of teaching assistance 
per year. One unit is the amount 
of assistance required to "teach" 
one recitation section per week 
for one quarter. 
One woman year (9-10 months) per 
year. 
One half (4.5 months full time 
equivalent) man year per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Table 53* (Continued). 
"Sers'' Product description 
626 Research assistance (specialty 
three research) provided by Ph.D. 
candidates, 
627 Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "specialty one" project 
research. 
®28 Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "specialty two" research. 
629 Secretarial and clerical assistance 
used by "specialty three" research. 
630 Faculty research services (specialty 
one, non-project research). 
6^2 Faculty research services (specialty 
one, project research). 
6^2 Faculty research services (specialty 
two research). 
633 Faculty research services (specialty 
three research). 
e3i}. Counselling and advising of under­
graduate students. 
63^ Counselling and advising of graduate 
students. 
Unit of measurement 
One half (4.5 months full time 
equivalent) man year per year. 
One woman year (9-10 months) per 
year. 
Same as above. 
tf M M 
One man year (9-10 months) per 
year. 
Same as above. 
H It N 
N It n 
One unit of counselling per year. 
One unit is the amount of advising 
required per student (discipline A 
major) per quarter. 
Same as above. 
Table 53» (Continued). 
^n%ber^^ Product description Unit of measurement 
635 Thesis (and related) supervision The supervision of 3 thesis credit 
of "specialty two" graduate hours per year. 
students. 
'37 Thesis (and related) supervision Same as above, 
of "specialty three" graduate 
students, 
N) 
to 
o 
Table 5^. Primary products, Economics department 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
®38 
®39 
®40 
Hz 
®45 
®46 
®47 
Instruction provided for Economics 
department graduate students by 
department A. 
Instruction provided for Economics 
department graduate students by 
department B. 
Teaching services provided to the 
Economics department by department 
A. 
Teaching services provided to the 
Economics department by department 
B. 
Large classroom use. 
Small classroom use. 
Office space use. 
Teaching budget funds. 
"Specialty one" (project) research 
funds• 
"Specialty two" research funds. 
Same as for ^ 2' 
Same as for eg. 
Same as for eg. 
Same as for eg. 
One classroom unit per year. One 
unit Is the amount (number of hours) 
of classroom use required to con­
duct a class meeting one hour per 
week for one quarter. 
Same as above. 
One square foot. 
One dollar per year. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
N> 
Table $4. (Continued). 
Commodity 
number Product description Unit of measurement 
*48 
6^ 9 
®50 
®51 
®52 
®53 
®54 
®55 
®57 
"Specialty three" research funds. 
"Specialty two" Masters* candidate. 
"Specialty three" Masters' candidate. 
"Specialty two" Ph.D. candidate. 
"Specialty three" Ph.D. candidates. 
"Specialty one" faculty members who 
enjoy no outside (non-university) 
research support. 
"Specialty one" faculty members who 
enjoy outside (non-university) 
research support. 
"Specialty two" faculty members, 
"Specialty three" faculty members. 
Faculty members proficient in both 
"Specialty one" and "Specialty three". 
One dollar per year. 
One new candidate per year, 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
One faculty member. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Table 55* Research activities. 
numbers ^5 ^7 ^8 ^9 ^10 ^11 ^12 ^3 ^14 ^9 ^6 ^7 ^18 
Commodity 
numbers 
®X2 —1*0 —1*1 
—1*1 —1*25 
—3*0 —2*25 —3*5 -2*0 —1*6 
@25 —3*0 —2*7 —3*1 —2*1 —1*6 
®22 '3  
62^ 2*0 4*0 
2 * 0  6 * 0  
635 4*0 8*0 
@26 4*0 6*0 
627 *1 *3 
628 *75 *5 1.0 1*5 *5 
629 1.0 *75 1*25 1*5 *5 
630 1 1 
631 1  ^
632 11 111 
,633 111 11 
. ei|6 800 500 
eij.7 4500 2500 5000 2000 1000 
4500 3500 4500 3000 1000 
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Table 56. "Degree" activities. 
Activity numbers ©19 0 
CM (U ®21 ®22 623 
Commodi ty 
numbers 
®1 -1 
®2 3 
2 
®4 4 
®5 3 
66 5 6 6 7 
®7 3 1 5 2 
1 2 1 4 
634 13 
6 6 10 10 
4 8 
®37 4 8 
®38 3 3 5 4 
®39 1 1 2 2 
®49 1 
®50 1 
®51 1 
®52 1 
Table 57• Undergraduate teaching and advising activities. 
Activity Advising Economics principles teaching Undergraduate teaching 
numbers @24 625 @26 ^27 ^30 ^31 ^32 ^33 ^34 ^36 
Commodity 
-i numbers 
62 -20.0 -60.0 -250.0 -400.0 -290.0 -35.0 
e^  —25*0 —30.0 
64 -25.0 -30.0 
65 -25.0-30.0 
616 1.0 .1 1.25 1.4 5.0 3.45 1.1 
6^  ^ .6 1.1 
618 .85 1.1 
615 .85 1.1 
620 1.0 1.5 .5 .25 .25 
621 2.0 15.0 21.0 15.0 
622 .1 .02 .03 .07 .13 .08 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
634 -50.0 
6^ 2 2 2 8 2 
643 3 3 14.5 19.0 16.0 3..O 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Table 58. Graduate teaching, advising and thesis supervision. 
Activity 
numbers 
Graduate 
advising 
®37 
Thesis 
supervision 
®38 ®39 
Graduate teaching 
®40 ®4l 6^2 
Commodity 
numbers 
®6 -20.0 
0
 
H
 
1 
®8 -15.0 
1.0 .2 .20 1.05 
®10 .65 
o
 
H
 1.05 
®11 .10 .65 1.05 
®22 A ,02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
®35 -100.0 
-7.5 
®37 -7.5 
.08 .07 
e^ i .02 .03 
643 3 3 3 
Table 59. Graduate student appointments. 
Masters candidate 
Activity appointments Ph.D. candiate appointments 
numbers 044 e^^^ e^^ e^y e^g e^p 651 «52 ^53 ^ $4 655 655 
Commodity 
numbers 
®20 ]L "3.6 —3.0 —6,0 —3»5 —3.6 —j.o —6,0 "3*3 
®21 —3 —18 —18 —1.8 —1.5 —1.8 —1,5 
623 -1 
624 -1 
@2^  =1 — *4 —.4 
©26 —1 — *4 — «4 
6414, 40 4o 40 40 47 60 60 60 60 47 60 60 60 60 
645 2850 2850 2040 1985 3^ 00 3355 2040 1985 3400 3355 
647 2750 3000 1270 1270 
648 2750 3000 1270 1270 
G4g -•5 -*5 
650 -•5 -.5 
651 -1/3 -3AO -3/10 -1/4 -1/4 
632 -1/3 -3/10 -3AO -1/4 -1/4 
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Table 60. Secretarial activities. 
Activity number e^g e^^ ego ®6l 
Commodity number 
®22 -1 
®27 -1 
«28 -1 
©29 -1 
e2j,4 140 140 140 14C 
ei^ 5 3400 
eij.6 3400 
©if7 3400 
eij,8 3400 
Table 6l, Faculty allocation activities. 
Activity 
numbers ®62 
"Transfer" activities 
©63 864 ©65 
Commodity 
numbers 
®9 
®10 
®11 
®16 
®17 
®18 
®19 
®30 
®31 
®32 
®33 
®# 
elf5 
©46 
®47 
648 
®53 
654 
-1.0 
1.0 
—1 • 0 —1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
-1 
1 
13000 
-13000 
"Specialty one" faculty allocations 
®66 ®67 ®68 ®69 ®70 ®7i 
— 2  » 0  
—6.0 
-.25 
125 
12250 
-5.0 
-3.0 
— * 25 —1.0 
125 125 
12250 12250 
-2 .0  -5 .0  
—6.0 —3•0 
—.25 —.25 —1.0 
125 125 125 
9750 9750 
3250 3250 13000 
N) 
ro 
vo 
Table 6l, (Continued). 
Activity 
numbers 
"Specialty two" 
faculty allocations 
72 73 '74 
Commodity 
numbers 
®9 
eio -2.0 
eil 
©16 
617 
ei8 
619 
©30 
«31 
@32 
633 
-.25 
6# 125 
645 12375 
©46 
647 4125 
©48 
-5.0 
—6.0 —3.0 
—•25 —1.0 
125 125 
12375 
4125 16500 
©54 
®55 
©56 
®57 
"Specialty three" Allocation activities for faculty 
faculty allocations members proficient In both "Spec­
ialties" "one" and "three" 
®75 ®76 ®77 ®78 ®79 ®80 ®8l ®82 
—2.0 —5*0 
—2.0 —5.0 —2.0 —5.0 
—6 » 0 —3 » 0 —6.0 —3.0 —6.0 —3.0 
—.25 —.25 —1.0 —.25 —.25 —.25 —.25 —1.0 
JO 
VjO 
o 
125 125 125 125 
11250 11250 
125 125 125 125 
11812 11812 11812 11812 
3750 3750 15000 3938 3938 3938 3938 15750 
1 1 1  
1  1 1 1 1  
231 
Table 62. Constraints, Economics department model. 
Commodity constraint^ Reason for constraint 
yg2. — " 100.0 
Yq2, ~ ~ 3000.0 
Ye] = - 700.0 
ygij. ~ — 200.0 
ye5 = - 300.0 
ye6 = - 15.0 
= - 40.0 
y^B = - 75.0 
ye9 = - 4 
FelO = - 2 
Fell = - 8 
e^l2^ e ~ ^ 612 ~ ® 
e^l3^ e - ^ el] =  ^
Ael4%e " ^ el^  = & 
e^l5^ e - ^ 615 = ° 
y^i — 0, 1=16,17.**37 
^e38 ~ 135.85 
ye39 ~ 53*83 
^e^O ^ 2*14 
= AgiZe for 1=1,2 
row of Aq. 
Fixed target 
ft fi 
H <t 
tt M 
M n  
It (• 
<1 (t 
M II 
II It 
n It 
tt It 
Accounting constraint 
n M 
M tt 
tt tt 
Intermediate products 
(accounting) constraints 
Resource allocation granted 
to Economics department by 
the college dean. 
Same as above* 
M tt tt 
* . . 57 where Agj_ is the ith 
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Table 62. (Continued). 
Commodity constraint^ Reason for constraint 
z 
0.73 Resource allocation granted to 
Economics department by the 
college dean. 
ye42 26.4 Same as above. 
^6^3 511.33 
M M H 
ye44 
% 
7093.00 if II II 
y e45 350,763.53 M II II 
ye46 7200. Resource constraints imposed by 
non-university suppliers of 
research funds. 
Fe^y 80,000 Same as above. 
ye48 
< 125,000 II II II 
0 ye49 6.0 Constraints due to students* 
decisions about graduate 
school attendance. 
0 FejO g 8.0 Same as above. 
0 < Fe^ l 
< 3.0 II M tl 
0 •A 
^652 4.0 
It It M 
ye53 5.0 Numbers of faculty positions 
authorized by university 
president. 
ye54 2.0 Same as above. 
^e55 
= 6.5 It It It 
— 8.0 M W It 
ye57 3.0 M M II 
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Table 63. Objective function weights associated with 
flexible targets, Econoraics department. 
objective function weights 
Yeo (= - Ze22)^  
e^oo (= - *623)^  . 
• Feooo (- - %e20)^  
Yeoooo (= - Xe2I)^  
yel2 (= - Zel) 
yel3 - %e2) 
yel4 (= - %e3) 
yel5 (= - %e4) 
aThe symbols shown in the parenthesis were used for 
computing purposes since they allowed the use of only non-
negative activity levels and the use of positive objective 
function weights. They are also easier to deal with in the 
discussions found in Chapter VII, 
bpor the commodities e^  through ©qooo constraints 
were included in the model (see Table 62) but had constraints 
been included they would have had the form y^  ^= - ^ q22* etc. 
-4.8 
-4.8 
-2.4 
-2.4 
—  2 . 0  
— 2 . 0  
-4.0 
—4.0 
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Table 64. Solution to department E model after constraints 
are imposed. 
Xe 
ibscript Solution value subscript Solution 
1 1.23 42 9.97 
2 0.60 43 0.0 
3 5.73 44 0.0 
4 9.76 45 0.0 
5 1.25 46 0.0 
6 0.0 47 10.43 
7 0.16 48 13.03 
8 0.34 49 0.0 
9 0.0 50 0.0 
10 0.0 51 0.0 
11 1.63 52 6.87 
12 0.0 53 12.87 
13 0.02 54 0.0 
14 0.0 55 0.0 
15 0.0 56 0.0 
16 2.15 57 0.0 
17 1.48 58 7.51 
18 0.0 59 0.12 
19 100.0 6o 1.64 
20 5.92 6l 4.90 
21 13.21 62 9.37 
22 9.06 63 8.54 
23 8.29 64 26.57 
24 26.0 65 0.0 
25 0.0 66 3.32 
26 0.0 67 1.68 
27 13.2 68 0.0 
28 0.0 69 0.0 
29 0.0 70 2.00 
30 0.0 71 0.0 
31 36.0 72 3.71 
32 0.0 73 2.76 
33 0.0 74 0.03 
34 20.0 75 6.36 
35 0.0 76 1.64 
36 20.0 77 0.0 
37 2.88 78 0.0 
38 12.82 79 0.0 
39 15.89 80 0.0 
40 11.81 81 1.83 
41 8.86 82 1.17 
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Table 65. Solution to the dual of department E. 
Variable Solution value®- Variable Solution valued 
e^l 1.442 (1.229) Ve30 1.527 (1.588) 
Ve2 .049 (0.029) e^31 1.612 (1.626) 
ve3 .065 (0.060) ?e32 5.384 (5.386) 
Ve4 .076 (0.068) ve33 5.605 (5.562) 
e^5 .076 (0.068) Ve34 0.049 (0.042) 
Ve6 .108 (0.098) Te35 0.039 (0.013) 
Ve7 .144 (0.131) ?e36 0.262 (0.246) 
03
 
.144 (0.131) Ve37 0.262 (0.246) 
Ve9 1.972 (1.689) 7e38 0.0 (0.470) 
?elO 1.972 (1.689) ve39 0.0 (0.617) 
?ell 1.972 (1.689) Ve40 0.0 (1.571) 
?el2 2.000 (2.000) Ve4l 0.0 (1.582) 
Vel3 2.000 (2.000) Ve42 2.600 (0.252) 
Vel4 4.000 (4.000) ve43 0.0 (0.036) 
Vel5 4.000 (4.000) 100Ve44 0.446 (0.466) 
Vel6 1.972 (1.689) 1000Ve2^ 5 1.209 (1.020) 
Vel7 1.972 (1.689) 1000Ve46 0.461 (0.446) 
7el8 1.972 (1.689) 1000ve47 0,261 (0.255) 
Vel9 1.972 (1.689) 1000Ve48 0.230 (0.230) 
Ve20 0.695 (0.592) Ve49 0.0 (0.0) 
Ve21 0.200 (0.171) ?e50 0.036 (0.033) 
Ve22 4.735 (4.120) Ve5l 0.799 (0.768) 
Te23 0.895 (0.709) Ve52 0.691 (0.716) 
Ve24 0.791 (0.648) Ve53 0.788 (0.827) 
Ve25 0.725 (0.728) Ve54 2.333 (I.936) 
^626 0.668 (0.669) ve55 0.525 (0.598) 
Ve27 2.192 (2.170) Ve56 2.155 (1.980) 
?e28 1.510 (1.518) ?e57 1.433 (1.364) 
Ve29 1.404 (1.433) 
&The values shown in the parentheses are elements 
of the vector which solves the dual of 7.2 (version 2 of the 
college model). 
